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Abstract
We prove a version of First Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing under transaction
costs for discrete-time markets with dividend-paying securities. Specifically, we show
that the no-arbitrage condition under the efficient friction assumption is equivalent
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1 Introduction
One of the central themes in mathematical finance is no-arbitrage pricing and its appli-
cations. At the foundation of no-arbitrage pricing is the First Fundamental Theorem of
Asset Pricing (FFTAP). We prove a version of the FFTAP under transaction costs1 for
discrete-time markets with dividend-paying securities.
The FFTAP has been proved in varying levels of generality for frictionless markets. In
a discrete-time setting for a finite state space, the theorem was first proved in Harrison and
Pliska [HP81]. Almost a decade later, Dalang, Morton, and Willinger [DMW90] proved
the FFTAP for the more technically challenging setting in which the state space is gen-
eral. Their approach requires the use of advanced, measurable selection arguments, which
motivated several authors to provide alternative proofs using more accessible techniques
(see Schachermayer [Sch92], Kabanov and Kramkov [KK94], Rogers [Rog94], Jacod and
Shiryaev [JS98], and Kabanov and Stricker [KS01b]). Using advanced concepts from func-
tional and stochastic analysis, the FFTAP was first proved in a general continuous-time
set-up in the celebrated paper by Delbaen and Schachermayer [DS94]. A comprehensive
review of the literature pertaining to no-arbitrage pricing theory in frictionless markets can
be found in Delbaen and Schachermayer [DS06].
The first rigorous study of the FFTAP for markets with transaction costs in a discrete-
time setting was carried out by Kabanov and Stricker [KS01a]. Under the assumption that
the state space is finite, it was proved that NA is equivalent to the existence of a consistent
pricing system (using the terminology introduced in Schachermayer [Sch04]). However,
their results did not extend to the case of a general state space. As in the frictionless
case, the transition from a finite state space to a general state space is nontrivial due to
measure-theoretic and topological related difficulties. These difficulties were overcome in
Kabanov, Ra´sonyi, and Stricker [KRS02], where a version of the FFTAP was proven under
the efficient friction assumption (EF). It was shown that the strict no-arbitrage condition,
a condition which is stronger than NA, is equivalent to the existence of a strictly consistent
pricing system. Therein, it was asked whether EF can be discarded. Schachermayer [Sch04]
answered this question negatively by showing that neither NA nor the strict no-arbitrage
condition alone is sufficiently strong to yield the existence of a consistent pricing system.
More importantly, Schachermayer [Sch04] proved a new version of the FFTAP that does
not require EF. Specifically, he proved that the robust no-arbitrage condition, which is
stronger than the strict no-arbitrage condition, is equivalent to the existence of a strictly
consistent pricing system. Subsequent studies that treat the robust no-arbitrage condition
are Bouchard [Bou06], Vallie`re, Kabanov, and Stricker [DVK07], Jacka, Berkaoui, and War-
ren [JBW08]. Recently, Pennanen [Pen11d, Pen11a, Pen11b, Pen11c] studied no-arbitrage
pricing in a general context in which markets can have constraints and transaction costs
may depend nonlinearly on traded amounts. Therein, the problem of superhedging a claims
1In this study, a transaction cost is defined as the cost incurred in trading in a market in which securities’
quoted prices have a bid-ask spread. We do not consider other costs such as broker’s fees and taxes.
2
process (e.g. swaps) is also investigated. An excellent survey of the literature pertaining to
no-arbitrage pricing in markets with transaction costs can be found in Kabanov and Safar-
ian [KS09]. Let us mention that versions of the FFTAP for markets with transaction costs in
a continuous-time setting have also been studied in the literature. This literature considers
stronger conditions than NA (see for instance Jouini and Kallal [JK95], Cherny [Che07],
Guasoni, Ra´sonyi, and Schachermayer [GMS10], Denis, Guasoni, and Ra´sonyi [DGR11],
Denis and Kabanov [DK12]).
The fundamental difference between no-arbitrage pricing theory for dividend-paying se-
curities and non-dividend paying securities is that transaction costs associated with trading
dividend-paying securities is that transaction costs associated with trading dividend-paying
securities may not be proportional to the number of units of securities purchased or sold.
Transaction costs associated with dividend-paying securities may accrue over time by merely
holding the security—for a non-dividend paying security transaction costs are only charged
whenever the security is bought or sold. Our consideration of transaction costs on dividends
distinguishes this study.
The contribution of this paper is summarized as follows:
• We define and study the value process and the self-financing condition under trans-
action costs for discrete-time markets with dividend-paying securities (Section 2).
• We define and investigate NA and EF in our context (Section 3).
• We prove a key closedness property of the set of claims that can be superhedged at
zero cost (Section 3.1).
• Using classic separation arguments, we prove a version of the FFTAP that is relevant
to our set-up. Specifically, we prove that NA under EF is satisfied if and only if there
exists a risk-neutral measure (Section 3.2).
• We introduce an appropriate notion of consistent pricing systems in our set-up, and we
study the relationship between them and NA under EF (Section 4). We demonstrate
that, if there are no transaction costs on the dividends paid by securities, NA under
EF is equivalent to the existence of a consistent pricing system (Section 4.1).
• We derive a dual representation for the superhedging ask and subhedging bid price
processes for a contingent claim (Section 5).
2 The value process and the self-financing condition
Let T be a fixed time horizon, and let T := {0, 1, . . . , T} and T ∗ := {1, 2, . . . , T}. Next, let
(Ω,FT ,F = (Ft)t∈T ,P) be the underlying filtered probability space.
On this probability space, we consider a market consisting of a savings account B and
of N traded securities satisfying the following properties:
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• The savings account can be purchased and sold according to the price process B :=((∏t
s=0(1 + rs)
))T
t=0
, where (rt)
T
t=0 is a nonnegative process specifying the risk-free
rate.
• The N securities can be purchased according to the ex-dividend price process P ask :=(
(P ask,1t , . . . , P
ask,N
t )
)T
t=0
, and pay (cumulative) dividends specified by the process
Aask :=
(
(Aask,1t , . . . , A
ask,N
t )
)T
t=1
. The quantity ∆Aaskt is the dividends per unit of
securities held long.
• The N securities can be sold according to the ex-dividend price process P bid :=(
(P bid,1t , . . . , P
bid,N
t )
)T
t=0
, and pay (cumulative) dividends specified by the process
Abid :=
(
(Abid,1t , . . . , A
bid,N
t )
)T
t=1
. The quantity ∆Abidt is the dividends per unit of
securities held short.
We assume that the processes introduced above adapted. In what follows, we shall denote
by ∆ the backward difference operator: ∆Xt := Xt − Xt−1, and we take the convention
that Aask0 = A
bid
0 = 0. It is easy to verify the following product rule for ∆:
∆(XtYt) = Xt−1∆Yt + Yt∆Xt = Xt∆Yt + Yt−1∆Xt.
Remark 2.1. For any t = 1, 2, . . . , T and j = 1, 2, . . . , N , the random variable ∆Aask,jt is
interpreted as amount of dividend associated with holding a long position in security j from
time t− 1 to time t, and the random variable ∆Abid,jt is interpreted as amount of dividend
associated with holding a short position in security j from time t− 1 to time t.
We now illustrate the processes introduced above in the context of a vanilla Credit
Default Swap (CDS) contract.
Example 2.1. A CDS contract is a contract between two parties, a protection buyer and
a protection seller, in which the protection buyer pays periodic fees to the protection seller
in exchange for some payment made by the protection seller to the protection buyer if a
pre-specified credit event of a reference entity occurs. Let τ be the nonnegative random
variable specifying the time of the credit event of the reference entity. Suppose the CDS
contract admits the following specifications: initiation date t = 0, expiration date t = T ,
and nominal value $1. For simplicity, we assume that the loss-given-default is a nonnegative
scalar δ and is paid at default. Typically, CDS contracts are traded on over-the-counter
markets in which dealers quote CDS spreads to investors. Suppose that the CDS spread
quoted by the dealer to sell a CDS contract with above specifications is κbid (to be received
every unit of time), and the CDS spread quoted by the dealer to buy a CDS contract with
above specifications is κask (to be paid every unit of time). We remark that the CDS spreads
κask and κbid are specified in the CDS contract, so the CDS contract to sell protection is
technically a different contract than the CDS contract to buy protection.
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The cumulative dividend processes Aask and Abid associated with buying and selling the
CDS with specifications above, respectively, are defined as
Aaskt := 1{τ≤t}δ − κ
ask
t∑
u=1
1{u<τ}, A
bid
t := 1{τ≤t}δ − κ
bid
t∑
u=1
1{u<τ}
for t ∈ T ∗. In this case, the ex-dividend ask and bid price processes P bid and P ask specify
the mark-to-market values of the CDS for the protection seller and protection buyer, re-
spectively, from the perspective of the protection buyer. The CDS spreads κask and κbid are
set so that P bid0 = P
ask
0 = 0. Also, we have that P
ask
T = P
bid
T = 0 since they are ex-dividend
prices.
Next, we illustrate the processes above with a vanilla Interest Rate Swap (IRS) contract.
Example 2.2. An IRS contract is a contract between two parties, in which one party agrees
to periodically pays a fixed rate (the swap rate) to the other party, in exchange for a floating
rate (usually the Libor rate). We suppose that the floating rate from i− 1 to i, denoted by
Li, is exchanged for the swap rate every unit of time. Also, we assume that the IRS admits
the following specifications: initiation date t = 0, expiration date t = T , and nominal value
$1. IRS contracts are traded on over-the-counter markets in which dealers quote swap rates
to investors. For the contract specified above, we denote by sask the swap rate quoted by
the dealer for a Payer IRS (pays the swap rate and receives the floating rate), and denote
by sbid the swap rate quoted by the dealer for a Receiver IRS (pays the floating rate and
receives the swap rate). We remark that the spreads sask and sbid are specified in the IRS
contract.
The cumulative dividend processes Abid and Aask associated with the Payer and Receiver
swap with specifications above, respectively, are defined as
Aaskt :=
t∑
i=1
(Li − s
ask), Abidt :=
t∑
i=1
(sbid − Li)
for t ∈ T ∗. The ex-dividend ask and bid price processes P bid and P ask specify the mark-to-
market values of the IRS for the Payer IRS and Receiver IRS, respectively. The values of
swap spreads sask and sbid are set so that P bid0 = P
ask
0 = 0 are null at initiation date, and
also note that P askT = P
bid
T = 0 since they are ex-dividend prices.
From now on, we make the following standing assumption.
Bid-Ask Assumption: P ask ≥ P bid and ∆Aask ≤ ∆Abid.
For convenience, we define J := {0, 1, . . . , N} and
J ∗ := {1, 2, . . . , N}. Unless stated otherwise, all inequalities and equalities between pro-
cesses and random variables are understood P-a.s. and coordinate-wise.
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2.1 The value process and self-financing condition
A trading strategy is a predictable process φ :=
(
(φ0t , φ
1
t , . . . , φ
N
t )
)T
t=1
, where φjt is interpreted
as the number of units of security j held from time t − 1 to time t. Processes φ1, . . . , φN
correspond to the holdings in the N securities, and process φ0 corresponds to the holdings
in the savings account B. We take the convention φ0 = (0, . . . , 0).
Definition 2.1. The value process (Vt(φ))
T
t=0 associated with a trading strategy φ is defined
as
Vt(φ) =

φ01 +
∑N
j=1 φ
j
1(1{φj1≥0}
P ask,j0 + 1{φj1<0}
P bid,j0 ), if t = 0,
φ0tBt +
∑N
j=1 φ
j
t (1{φjt≥0}
P bid,jt + 1{φjt<0}
P ask,jt )
+
∑N
j=1 φ
j
t(1{φjt<0}
∆Abid,jt + 1{φjt≥0}
∆Aask,jt ), if 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
For t = 0, V0(φ) is interpreted as the cost of the portfolio φ, and for t ∈ {1, . . . , T} it is
interpreted as the liquidation value of the portfolio before any time t transactions, including
any dividends acquired from time t− 1 to time t.
Remark 2.2. Also note that, due to the presence of transaction costs, the value process V
may not be linear in its argument, i.e. Vt(φ) + Vt(ψ) 6= Vt(φ + ψ), and Vt(αφ) 6= αVt(φ)
for α ∈ R, and some trading strategies φ,ψ, some time t ∈ T . This is the major difference
from the frictionless setting.
Next, we introduce the self-financing condition, which is appropriate in the context of
this paper.
Definition 2.2. A trading strategy φ is self-financing if
Bt∆φ
0
t+1 +
N∑
j=1
∆φjt+1(1{∆φjt+1≥0}
P ask,jt + 1{∆φjt+1<0}
P bid,jt )
=
N∑
j=1
φjt (1{φjt≥0}
∆Aask,jt + 1{φjt<0}
∆Abid,jt ) (1)
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1.
The self-financing condition imposes the restriction that no money can flow in or out
of the portfolio. We note that if P := P ask = P bid and ∆A := ∆Aask = ∆Abid, then the
self-financing condition in the frictionless case is recovered.
Remark 2.3. Note that the self-financing condition not only takes into account transaction
costs due purchases and sales of securities (left hand side of (1)), but also transaction costs
accrued through the dividends (right hand side of (1)).
The next result gives a useful characterization of the self-financing condition in terms
of the value process.
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Proposition 2.4. A trading strategy φ is self-financing if and only if the value process V (φ)
satisfies
Vt(φ) = V0(φ) +
t∑
u=1
φ0u∆Bu +
N∑
j=1
φjt
(
1
{φjt≥0}
P bid,jt + 1{φjt<0}
P ask,jt
)
−
N∑
j=1
t∑
u=1
∆φju
(
1
{∆φju≥0}
P ask,ju−1 + 1{∆φju<0}P
bid,j
u−1
)
+
N∑
j=1
t∑
u=1
φju
(
1
{φju≥0}
∆Aask,ju + 1{φju<0}∆A
bid,j
u
)
(2)
for all t ∈ T ∗.
Proof. By the definition of V (φ), and applying the product rule for the backwards difference
operator ∆, we obtain
Vt(φ) = V0(φ) +
t∑
u=1
φ0u∆Bu +
t∑
u=2
Bu−1∆φ
0
u (3)
−
N∑
j=1
φj1
(
1
{φj1<0}
P bid,j0 + 1{φj1≥0}
P ask,j0
)
+
N∑
j=1
φjt
(
1
{φjt≥0}
P bid,jt + 1{φjt<0}
P ask,jt
)
+
N∑
j=1
t∑
u=1
φju
(
1
{φju≥0}
∆Aask,ju + 1{φju<0}∆A
bid,j
u
)
−
N∑
j=1
t∑
u=2
φju−1
(
1
{φju−1<0}
∆Abid,ju−1 + 1{φju−1≥0}
∆Aask,ju−1
)
.
If φ is self-financing, then we see that (3) reduces to (2). Conversely, assume that the
value process satisfies (2). Subtracting (2) from (3) and applying the product rule for the
backwards difference ∆ to both sides yields that φ is self-financing.
The next proposition extends the previous result in terms of our nume´raire B. For
convenience, we let V ∗(φ) := B−1V (φ) for all trading strategies φ.
Proposition 2.5. A trading strategy φ is self-financing if and only if the discounted value
process V ∗(φ) satisfies
V ∗t (φ) = V0(φ) +
N∑
j=1
φjtB
−1
t
(
1
{φjt≥0}
P bid,jt + 1{φjt<0}
P ask,jt
)
−
N∑
j=1
t∑
u=1
∆φjuB
−1
u−1
(
1
{∆φju≥0}
P ask,ju−1 + 1{∆φju<0}P
bid,j
u−1
)
+
N∑
j=1
t∑
u=1
φjuB
−1
u
(
1
{φju≥0}
∆Aask,ju + 1{φju<0}∆A
bid,j
u
)
(4)
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for all t ∈ T ∗.
Proof. Suppose that φ is self-financing. We may apply Proposition 2.4 and the product rule
for the backwards difference ∆ to see that
∆
(
B−1t Vt(φ)
)
=
N∑
j=1
∆
(
φjtB
−1
t
(
1
{φjt≥0}
P bid,jt + 1{φjt<0}
P ask,jt
))
−
N∑
j=1
∆φjtB
−1
t−1
(
1
{∆φjt≥0}
P ask,jt−1 + 1{∆φjt<0}
P bid,jt−1
)
+
N∑
j=1
φjtB
−1
t
(
1
{φjt≥0}
∆Aask,jt + 1{φjt<0}
∆Abid,jt
)
for all t ∈ T ∗. Summing both sides of the equation from u = 1 to u = t shows that necessity
holds.
Conversely, if the value process V (φ) satisfies (4), we may apply the product rule for
the backwards difference ∆ to ∆
(
B(B−1V (φ))
)
to deduce that
∆Vt(φ) = φ
0
t∆Bt +
N∑
j=1
∆
(
φjt
(
1
{φjt≥0}
P bid,jt + 1{φjt<0}
P ask,jt
))
−
N∑
j=1
∆φjt
(
1
{∆φjt≥0}
P ask,jt−1 + 1{∆φjt<0}
P bid,jt−1
)
+
N∑
j=1
φjt
(
1
{φjt≥0}
∆Aask,jt + 1{φjt<0}
∆Abid,jt
)
.
After summing both sides of the equation above from u = 1 to u = t and applying Propo-
sition 2.4, we see that φ is self-financing.
Remark 2.6. If P = P ask = P bid and ∆A = ∆Aask = ∆Abid, then we recover the classic
result: a trading strategy φ is self-financing if and only if the value process satisfies
V ∗t (φ) = V0(φ) +
N∑
j=1
t∑
u=1
φju∆
(
B−1u P
j
u +
u∑
w=1
B−1w ∆A
j
w
)
for all t ∈ T ∗.
For convenience, we define P ask,∗ := B−1P ask, P bid,∗ := B−1P bid, Aask,∗ := B−1∆Aask,
and Abid,∗ := B−1∆Abid,.
In frictionless markets, the set of all self-financing trading strategies is a linear space
because securities’ prices are not influenced by the direction of trading. This is no longer
the case if the direction of trading matters: the strategy φ + ψ may not be self-financing
even if φ and ψ are self-financing. Intuitively this is true because transaction costs can be
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avoided whenever φjtψ
j
t < 0 by combining orders. However, the strategy (θ
0, φ1 + ψ1, φ2 +
ψ2, . . . , φN +ψN ) can enjoy the self-financing property if the units in the savings account θ0
are properly adjusted. The next lemma shows that such θ0 exists, is unique, and satisfies
φ0 + ψ0 ≤ θ0.
Proposition 2.7. Let ψ and φ be any two self-financing trading strategies with V0(ψ) =
V0(φ) = 0. Then there exists a unique predictable process θ
0 such that the trading strategy
θ defined as θ := (θ0, φ1 + ψ1, . . . , φN + ψN ) is self-financing with V0(θ) = 0. Moreover,
φ0 + ψ0 ≤ θ0.
Proof. The trading strategies φ and ψ are self-financing, so by definition we have that
Bt−1∆φ
0
t+
N∑
j=1
∆φjt
(
1
{∆φjt≥0}
P ask,jt−1 + 1{∆φjt<0}
P bid,jt−1
)
(5)
=
N∑
j=1
φjt−1
(
1
{φjt−1≥0}
∆Aask,jt−1 + 1{φjt−1<0}
∆Abid,jt−1
)
and
Bt−1∆ψ
0
t+
N∑
j=1
∆ψjt
(
1
{∆ψjt≥0}
P ask,jt−1 + 1{∆ψjt<0}
P bid,jt−1
)
(6)
=
N∑
j=1
ψjt−1
(
1
{ψjt−1≥0}
∆Aask,jt−1 + 1{ψjt−1<0}
∆Abid,jt−1
)
for t = 2, 3, . . . , T . By adding equations (5) and (6), and rearranging terms we see that
ψ0t + φ
0
t = ψ
0
t−1 + φ
0
t−1 +B
−1
t−1
(
−
N∑
j=1
P ask,jt−1
(
∆φjt +∆ψ
j
t
)
(7)
+
N∑
j=1
(
φjt−1 + ψ
j
t−1
)
∆Aask,jt−1
+
N∑
j=1
(
P ask,jt−1 − P
bid,j
t−1
)(
1
{∆φjt<0}
∆φjt + 1{∆ψjt<0}
∆ψjt
)
+
N∑
j=1
(
1
{φjt−1<0}
φjt−1 + 1{ψjt−1<0}
ψjt−1
)(
∆Abid,jt−1 −∆A
ask,j
t−1
))
for t = 2, 3, . . . , T . Now recursively define the process θ0 as
θ01 : = −
N∑
j=1
(
1
{φj1≥0}
φj1 + 1{ψj1≥0}
ψj1
)
P ask,j0 −
N∑
j=1
(
1
{φj1<0}
φj1 + 1{ψj1<0}
ψj1
)
P bid,j0 ,
9
and
θ0t := θ
0
t−1 +B
−1
t−1
(
−
N∑
j=1
∆
(
φjt + ψ
j
t
)
P ask,jt−1 +
N∑
j=1
(
φjt−1 + ψ
j
t−1
)
∆Aask,jt−1 (8)
+
N∑
j=1
1
{∆(φjt+ψ
j
t )<0}
∆
(
φjt + ψ
j
t
)(
P ask,jt−1 − P
bid,j
t−1
)
+
N∑
j=1
1
{φjt−1+ψ
j
t−1<0}
(
φjt−1 + ψ
j
t−1
)(
∆Abid,jt−1 −∆A
ask,j
t−1
))
for t = 2, 3, . . . , T . It follows that θ0 is unique and is self-financing. By definition, the
trading strategy θ := (θ0, φ1 + ψ1, . . . , φN + ψN ) is self-financing. Subtracting (7) from (8)
yields
θ0t − (φ
0
t + ψ
0
t ) = θ
0
t−1 −
(
φ0t−1 + ψ
0
t−1
)
(9)
+
N∑
j=1
1
{∆φjt+ψ
j
t )<0}
∆
(
φjt + ψ
j
t
)(
P ask,jt−1 − P
bid,j
t−1
)
−
N∑
j=1
(
1
{∆φjt<0}
∆φjt + 1{∆ψjt<0}
∆ψjt
)(
P ask,jt−1 − P
bid,j
t−1
)
+
N∑
j=1
(
φjt−1 + ψ
j
t−1
)
1
{φjt−1+ψ
j
t−1<0}
(
∆Abid,jt−1 −∆A
ask,j
t−1
)
−
N∑
j=1
(
φjt−11{φjt−1<0}
+ ψjt−11{ψjt−1<0}
)(
∆Abid,jt−1 −∆A
ask,j
t−1
)
for t = 2, 3, . . . , T . It is straightforward to verify that the inequality
1{X<0}X + 1{Y <0}Y ≤ 1{X+Y <0}(X + Y ) (10)
holds for any random variables X and Y . Moreover, the inequalities P bid ≤ P ask and
∆Aask ≤ ∆Abid hold by assumption. Hence, (9) reduces to
θ0t −
(
φ0t + ψ
0
t
)
≥ θ0t−1 −
(
φ0t−1 + ψ
0
t−1
)
(11)
for t = 2, 3, . . . , T . Since V0(φ) = V0(ψ) = 0, it follows that θ
0
1 = φ
0
1 + ψ
0
1 and V0(θ) =
V0(φ) + V0(ψ) = 0. After recursively solving (11), we conclude that θ
0
t ≥ φ
0
t + ψ
0
t for all
t ∈ T ∗.
The next result is the natural extension of the previous proposition to value processes.
It is intuitively true since some transaction costs may be avoided by combining orders.
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Theorem 2.8. Let φ and ψ be any two self-financing trading strategies such that V0(φ) =
V0(ψ) = 0. There exists a unique predictable process θ
0 such that the trading strategy defined
as θ := (θ0, φ1 + ψ1, . . . , φN + ψN ) is self-financing with V0(θ) = 0, and VT (θ) satisfies
VT (φ) + VT (ψ) ≤ VT (θ).
Proof. Let φ and ψ be self-financing trading strategies. By applying Proposition 2.4 and
rearranging terms, we may write
VT (φ) + VT (ψ) =
T∑
u=1
(φ0u + ψ
0
u)∆Bu
+
N∑
j=1
(
φjT + ψ
j
T
)(
1
{φj
T
+ψj
T
≥0}
P bid,jT + 1{φj
T
+ψj
T
<0}
P ask,jT
)
−
N∑
j=1
T∑
u=1
(
∆φju +∆ψ
j
u
)(
1
{∆φju+∆ψ
j
u≥0}
P ask,ju−1 + 1{∆φju+∆ψju<0}P
bid,j
u−1
)
+
N∑
j=1
T∑
u=1
(
φju + ψ
j
u
)(
1
{φju+ψ
j
u≥0}
∆Aask,ju + 1{φju+ψju<0}∆A
bid,j
u
)
− C1 − C2,
(12)
where C1 is defined as
C1 :=
N∑
j=1
((
1
{φj
T
≥0}
φjT + 1{ψj
T
≥0}
ψjT
)
P ask,jT +
(
1
{φj
T
<0}
φjT + 1{ψj
T
<0}
ψjT
)
P bid,jT
)
−
N∑
j=1
T∑
u=1
(
1
{∆φju<0}
∆φju + 1{∆ψju<0}∆ψ
j
u
)
P ask,ju−1
−
N∑
j=1
T∑
u=1
(
1
{∆φju≥0}
∆φju + 1{∆ψju≥0}∆ψ
j
u
)
P bid,ju−1
+
N∑
j=1
T∑
u=1
((
1
{φju≥0}
φju + 1{ψju≥0}ψ
j
u
)
∆Abid,ju +
(
1
{φju<0}
φju + 1{ψju<0}ψ
j
u
)
∆Aask,ju
)
,
and C2 is defined as
C2 := −
N∑
j=1
(
φjT + ψ
j
T
)(
1
{φj
T
+ψj
T
<0}
P bid,jT + 1{φj
T
+ψj
T
≥0}
P ask,jT
)
+
N∑
j=1
T∑
u=1
(
∆φju +∆ψ
j
u
)(
1
{∆φju+∆ψ
j
u≥0}
P bid,ju−1 + 1{∆φju+∆ψju<0}P
ask,j
u−1
)
−
N∑
j=1
T∑
u=1
(
φju + ψ
j
u
)(
1
{φju+ψ
j
u≥0}
∆Abid,ju + 1{φju+ψju<0}∆A
ask,j
u
)
.
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By Proposition 2.7, there exists a unique predictable process θ0 such that the trading
strategy defined as θ := (θ0, φ1 + ψ1, . . . , φN + ψN ) is self-financing with V0(θ) = 0 and
satisfies φ0 + ψ0 ≤ θ0. In view of Proposition 2.5, since θ is self-financing, it follows that
VT (θ) =
T∑
u=1
θ0u∆Bu +
N∑
j=1
(
φjT + ψ
j
T
)(
1
{φj
T
+ψj
T
≥0}
P bid,jT + 1{φj
T
+ψj
T
<0}
P ask,jT
)
−
N∑
j=1
T∑
u=1
(
∆φju +∆ψ
j
u
)(
1
{∆φju+∆ψ
j
u≥0}
P ask,ju−1 + 1{∆φju+∆ψju<0}P
bid,j
u−1
)
+
N∑
j=1
T∑
u=1
(
φju + ψ
j
u
)(
1
{φju+ψ
j
u≥0}
∆Aask,ju +
T∑
u=1
1
{φju+ψ
j
u<0}
∆Abid,ju
)
. (13)
Comparing equations (12) and (13) we see that
VT (φ) + VT (ψ) = VT (θ) +
T∑
u=1
(φ0u + ψ
0
u − θ
0
u)∆Bu − C
1 − C2. (14)
According to (10), the random variable C1+C2 is nonnegative. Moreover, since φ0+ψ0 ≤ θ0
and ∆B ≥ 0, it follows that
∑T
u=1(φ
0
u + ψ
0
u − θ
0
u)∆Bu ≤ 0 From (14), we conclude that
VT (φ) + VT (ψ) ≤ VT (θ).
The following technical lemma, which easy to verify, will be used in the next section.
Lemma 2.1. The following hold:
• Let Y a and Y b be any random variables, and suppose Xm is a sequence of R-valued
random variables converging a.s. to X. Then 1{Xm≥0}X
mY b + 1{Xm<0}X
mY a con-
verges a.s. to 1{X≥0}XY
b + 1{X<0}XY
a.
• If a sequence of trading strategies φm converges a.s. to φ, then V (φm) converges a.s.
to V (φ).
2.2 The set of claims that can be superhedged at zero cost
For all t ∈ T , denote by L0(Ω,Ft,P ;R
(N+1)) the space of all (P-equivalence classes of)
R(N+1)-valued, Ft-measurable random variables. We equip L
0(Ω,Ft,P ;R) with the topol-
ogy of convergence in measure P. Also, let S be the set of all self-financing trading strategies.
For the sake of conciseness, we will refer to sets that are closed with respect to convergence
in measure P simply as P-closed.
We define the sets
K :=
{
V ∗T (φ) : φ ∈ S, V0(φ) = 0
}
,
L0+(Ω,FT ,P ;R) :=
{
X ∈ L0(Ω,FT ,P ;R) : X ≥ 0
}
,
K − L0+(Ω,FT ,P ;R) :=
{
Y −X : Y ∈ K and X ∈ L0+(Ω,FT ,P ;R)
}
.
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The set K is the set of attainable claims at zero cost. On the other hand, K−L0+(Ω,FT ,P ;R)
is the set of claims that can be superhedged at zero cost : for any X ∈ K − L0+(Ω,FT ,P ;R),
there exists an attainable value at zero cost K ∈ K so that X ≤ K.
The following lemma asserts that the set of claims that can be superhedged at zero cost
is a convex cone.
Lemma 2.2. The set K − L0+(Ω,FT ,P ;R) is a convex cone.
Proof. Let Y 1, Y 2 ∈ K − L0+(Ω,FT ,P ;R). Then there exist K
1,K2 ∈ K and Z1, Z2 ∈
L0+(Ω,FT ,P ;R) such that Y
1 = K1 − Z1 and Y 2 = K2 − Z2. By definition of K, there
exists φ,ψ ∈ S with V0(φ) = V0(ψ) = 0 such that K
1 = V ∗T (φ) and K
2 = V ∗T (ψ). We will
prove that for any positive scalars α1 and α2 the following holds
α1(V
∗
T (φ)− Z
1) + α2(V
∗
T (ψ)− Z
2) ∈ K − L0+(Ω,FT ,P ;R),
or, equivalently, that there exists K ∈ K such that
α1V
∗
T (φ) + α2V
∗
T (ψ)− α1Z
1 − α2Z
2 ≤ K.
The value process is positive homogeneous, so α1V
∗
T (φ) + α2V
∗
T (ψ) = V
∗
T (α1φ) + V
∗
T (α2ψ).
According to Theorem 2.8, there exists a unique predictable process θ0 such that the trading
strategy defined as θ := (θ0, α1φ
1+α2ψ
1, . . . , α1φ
N+α2ψ
N ) is self-financing with V0(θ) = 0,
and satisfies V ∗T (α1φ) + V
∗
T (α2ψ) ≤ V
∗
T (θ). By definition, we have V
∗
T (θ) ∈ K. Since
α1V
∗
T (φ) + α2V
∗
T (ψ) − α1Z
1 − α2Z
2 = V ∗T (α1φ) + V
∗
T (α2ψ)− α1Z
1 − α2Z
2
≤ V ∗T (θ)− α1Z
1 − α2Z
2 ≤ V ∗T (θ),
we conclude that the claim holds.
Remark 2.9. The set K is not necessarily a convex cone. To see this, lets suppose that T = 1,
J = {0, 1}, and r = 0. Consider the trading strategies φ = {φ0, 1} and ψ = {ψ0,−1}, where
φ0 and ψ0 are chosen so that V0(φ) = V0(ψ) = 0. By definition, V1(φ), V1(ψ) ∈ K. However,
V ∗1 (φ) + V
∗
1 (ψ) = P
bid
1 − P
ask
1 +A
ask
1 −A
bid
1 + P
bid
0 − P
ask
0 ,
is generally not in the set K.
3 The no-arbitrage condition
We begin by introducing the definition of the no-arbitrage condition.
Definition 3.1. The no-arbitrage condition (NA) is satisfied if for each φ ∈ S such that
V0(φ) = 0 and VT (φ) ≥ 0, we have VT (φ) = 0.
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In the present context, NA has the usual interpretation that “it is impossible to make
something out of nothing.” The next lemma provides us equivalent conditions to NA in
terms of the set of attainable claims at zero cost, and also in terms of the set of claims that
can be superhedged at zero cost. They are straightforward to verify.
Lemma 3.1. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) NA is satisfied.
(ii)
(
K − L0+(Ω,FT ,P ;R)
)
∩ L0+(Ω,FT ,P ;R) = {0}.
(iii) K ∩ L0+(Ω,FT ,P ;R) = {0}.
We proceed by defining The Efficient Friction Assumption in our context (cf. Kabanov
et al. [KRS02]).
The Efficient Friction Assumption (EF):{
φ ∈ S : V0(φ) = VT (φ) = 0
}
= {0}. (15)
Note that if (15) is satisfied, then for each φ ∈ S, we have V0(φ) = VT (φ) = 0 if and
only if φ = 0. The efficient friction assumption, which was introduced by Kabanov et
al. [KRS02], states that the only portfolio that can be liquidated into the zero portfolio
that is available at zero price is the zero portfolio. In the present context, EF has the same
interpretation: the only zero-cost, self-financing strategy that can be liquidated into the
zero portfolio is the zero portfolio.
We will denote byNAEF the no-arbitrage condition under the efficient friction assump-
tion.
In what follows, we denote by P the set of all RN -valued, F-predictable processes. Also,
we define the mapping
F (φ) :=
N∑
j=1
φjT
(
1
{φj
T
≥0}
P bid,j,∗T + 1{φj
T
<0}
P ask,j,∗T
)
−
N∑
j=1
T∑
u=1
∆φju
(
1
{∆φju≥0}
P ask,j,∗u−1 + 1{∆φju<0}P
bid,j,∗
u−1
)
+
N∑
j=1
T∑
u=1
φju
(
1
{φju≥0}
Aask,j,∗u + 1{φju<0}A
bid,j,∗
u
)
(16)
for all RN -valued stochastic processes
(φs)
T
s=1 ∈ L
0(Ω,FT ,P;R
N )× · · · × L0(Ω,FT ,P;R
N ),
and let K := {F (φ) : φ ∈ P}. In view of Proposition 2.5, we note that V ∗T (φ) = V0(φ)+F (φ)
for all self-financing trading strategies φ
Remark 3.1.
(i) Note that F is defined on the set of all RN -valued stochastic processes. On the
contrary, the value process is defined on the set of trading strategies, which are RN+1-
valued predictable processes.
(ii) The set K has the same financial interpretation as the set K. We introduce the set K
because it is more convenient to work with from the mathematical point of view.
(iii) F (αφ) = αF (φ) for any nonnegative random variable α.
The next results provides an equivalent condition for EF to hold.
Lemma 3.2. The efficient friction assumption (EF) is satisfied if and only if {ψ ∈ P :
F (ψ) = 0} = {0}.
Proof. Let ψ ∈ P be such that F (ψ) = 0. We define the trading strategy
φ := (φ0, ψ1, . . . , ψN ), where φ0 is chosen so that ψ ∈ S and V0(φ) = 0. we see that
V ∗T (φ) = F (ψ), which gives us V
∗
T (φ) = 0. EF is satisfied, so φ
j = 0 for j = 0, . . . , N , which
in particular implies that ψj = 0 for j = 1, . . . , N .
Conversely, suppose EF holds, and fix φ ∈ S so that V0(φ) = V
∗
T (φ) = 0. Define the
predictable process ψj := φj for j = 1, . . . , N . By Proposition 2.5 and the definition of
F , it is true that F (ψ) = V ∗T (φ). Thus, F (ψ) = 0. By assumption, we have that ψ
j = 0
for j = 1, . . . , N , which implies φj = 0 for j = 1, . . . , N . From the definition of V0(φ)
and because V0(φ) = 0, it follows that φ
0
1 = 0. Since φ ∈ S, we may recursively solve for
φ02, . . . , φ
0
T to deduce that φ
0
t = 0 for t = 2, . . . , T . Hence, φ
j = 0 for j = 0, 1, . . . , N .
Lemma 3.3. We have that K = K.
Proof. The claim follows from Proposition 2.5.
3.1 Closedness property of the set of claims that can be superhedged at
zero cost
In this section, we prove that the set of claims that can be superhedged at zero cost,
K−L0+(Ω,FT ,P ;R), is P-closed whenever NAEF is satisfied. This property plays a central
role in the proof of the First Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing (Theorem 3.5).
We will denote by ‖ · ‖ the Euclidean norm on RN .
Let us first recall the following lemma from Schachermayer [Sch04], which is closely
related to Lemma 2 in Kabanov and Stricker [KS01b].
Lemma 3.4. For a sequence of random variables Xm ∈ L0(Ω,F ,P;RN ) there is a strictly
increasing sequence of positive, integer-valued, F-measurable random variables τm such that
Xτ
m
converges a.s. in the one-point-compactification RN ∪ {∞} to some random variable
X ∈ L0(Ω,F ,P;RN ∪ {∞}). Moreover, we may find the subsequence such that ‖X‖ =
lim supm ‖X
m‖, where ‖∞‖ =∞.
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The next result extends the previous lemma to processes.
Lemma 3.5. Let F i be a σ-algebra, and Y mi ∈ L
0(Ω,F i,P;RN ) for i = 1, . . . ,M . Suppose
that F i ⊆ F j for all i ≤ j, and that Y mi satisfies lim supm ‖Y
m
i ‖ < ∞ for i = 1, . . . ,M .
Then there is a strictly increasing sequence of positive, integer-valued, FM -measurable ran-
dom variables τm such that, for i = 1, . . . ,M , the sequence Y τ
m
i converges a.s. to some
Yi ∈ L
0(Ω,F i,P;RN ).
Proof. We first apply Lemma 3.4 to the random variable Y m1 : there exists a strictly in-
creasing sequence of positive, integer-valued, F1-measurable random variables τm1 such that
{τ11 (ω), τ
2
1 (ω), . . . , } ⊆ N for ω ∈ Ω, and Y
τm1
1 converges a.s. to some Y1 ∈ L
0(Ω,F1,P;RN ).
Since lim supm ‖Y
m
2 ‖ < ∞, we also have that lim supm ‖Y
τm1
2 ‖ < ∞. Moreover, Y
τm1
2 ∈
L0(Ω,F2,P;RN ) since F1 ⊆ F2. Therefore, we may apply Lemma 3.4 to the sequence Y
τm1
2
to find a strictly increasing sequence of positive, integer-valued, F2-measurable random
variables τm2 such that
{τ12 (ω), τ
2
2 (ω), . . . } ⊆ {τ
1
1 (ω), τ
2
1 (ω), . . . } ⊆ N, a.e. ω ∈ Ω, (17)
and Y
τm2
2 converges a.s. to some Y2 ∈ L
0(Ω,F2,P;RN ). From (17), the sequence Y
τm2
1
converges a.s. to Y1.
We may continue by recursively repeating the argument above to the sequences Y mi , for
i = 3, . . . ,M , to find strictly increasing sequences of positive, integer-valued, F i-measurable
random variables τmi such that
{τ1i (ω), τ
2
i (ω), . . . } ⊆ · · · ⊆ {τ
1
1 (ω), τ
2
1 (ω), . . . } ⊆ N, a.e. ω ∈ Ω, (18)
and Y
τmi
i converges a.s. to some Yi ∈ L
0(Ω,F i,P;RN ). Because of (18), we see that Y
τmM
i
converges a.s. to Yi for i = 1, . . . ,M . Therefore, τ
m := τmM defines the desired sequence.
We proceed by proving a technical lemma.
Lemma 3.6. Let F i be a σ-algebra, and Y mi ∈ L
0(Ω,F i,P;RN ) for i = 1, . . . ,M . Suppose
that F i ⊆ F j for all i ≤ j, and that there exists k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and Ω′ ⊆ Ω with P(Ω′) > 0
such that lim supm ‖Y
m
k (ω)‖ = ∞ for a.e. ω ∈ Ω
′, and lim supm ‖Y
m
i (ω)‖ < ∞ for i =
1, . . . , k− 1 and for a.e. ω ∈ Ω. Then there exists a strictly increasing sequence of positive,
integer-valued, Fk-measurable random variables τm such that limm ‖Y
τm
k (ω)‖ =∞, for a.e.
ω ∈ Ω′, and 2
Xmi (ω) := 1Ω′(ω)
Y
τm(ω)
i (ω)
‖Y
τm(ω)
k (ω)‖
, ω ∈ Ω, i = 1, . . . ,M,
satisfies limmX
m
i (ω) = 0, for i = 1, . . . , k − 1 and for a.e. ω ∈ Ω
2We take Xmi (ω) = 0 whenever ‖Y
τm(ω)
k (ω)‖ = 0. We will take the convention x/0 = 0 throughout this
section.
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Proof. Since lim supm ‖Y
m
k (ω)‖ = ∞ for a.e. ω ∈ Ω
′, we may apply Lemma 3.4 to the
sequence Y mk to find a strictly increasing sequence of positive, integer-valued, F
k-measurable
random variables τm so that ‖Y
τm(ω)
k (ω)‖ diverges for a.e. ω ∈ Ω
′.
Because lim supm ‖Y
m
i ‖ < ∞ for i = 1, . . . , k − 1, we have lim supm ‖Y
τm
i ‖ < ∞ for
i = 1, . . . , k − 1. Now since ‖Y
τm(ω)
k (ω)‖ diverges for a.e. ω ∈ Ω
′,
lim
m→∞
‖Xmi (ω)‖ = 1Ω′(ω)
‖Y
τm(ω)
i (ω)‖
‖Y
τm(ω)
k (ω)‖
= 0, a.e. ω ∈ Ω, i = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Thus, ‖Xmi ‖ converges a.s. to 0 for i = 1, . . . , k − 1, which implies that X
m
i converges a.s.
to 0 for i = 1, . . . , k − 1. Hence, the claim holds.
We are now ready to prove the crucial result in this paper.
Theorem 3.2. If the no-arbitrage condition under the efficient friction assumption
(NAEF) is satisfied, then the set K − L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R) is P-closed.
Proof. According to Lemma 3.3, we may equivalently prove that K − L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R) is
P-closed. Suppose that Xm ∈ K − L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R) converges in probability to X. Then
there exists a subsequence Xkm of Xk so that Xkm converges a.s. to X. With a slight abuse
of notation, we will denote by Xm the sequence Xkm in what follows. By the definition of
K− L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R), there exists Z
m ∈ L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R) and φ
m ∈ P so that
Xm = F (φm)− Zm. (19)
We proceed the proof in two steps. In the first step, we show by contradiction that
lim supm ‖φ
m
s ‖ <∞ for all s ∈ T
∗.
Step 1a: Let us assume that lim supm ‖φ
m
s ‖ <∞ for all s ∈ T
∗ does not hold. Then
I0 :=
{
s ∈ T ∗ : ∃ Ω′ ⊆ Ω such that P(Ω′) > 0, lim sup
m→∞
‖φms (ω)‖ =∞ for a.e. ω ∈ Ω
′
}
is nonempty. Let t0 := min I
0, and define the Ft0−1-measurable set
E0 :=
{
ω ∈ Ω : lim sup
m→∞
‖φmt0 (ω)‖ =∞}.
Note that P(E0) > 0 by assumption. We now apply Lemma 3.6 to φm: there exists a
strictly increasing sequence of positive, integer-valued, Ft0−1-measurable random variables
τm0 such that
lim
m→∞
‖φ
τm0 (ω)
t0
(ω)‖ =∞, a.e. ω ∈ E0, (20)
and
ψm,(0)s := 1E0
φ
τm0
s
‖φ
τm0
t0
‖
, s ∈ T ∗, (21)
satisfies limm ψ
m,(0)
s (ω) = 0, for s = 1, . . . , t0 − 1, for a.e. ω ∈ Ω.
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We proceed as follows.
Recursively for i = 1, . . . , T
If lim supm ‖ψ
m,(i−1)
s ‖ < ∞ for all s ∈ {ti−1 + 1, . . . , T}, then define k := i and ϕm :=
ψm,(k−1), and proceed to Step 1b.
Else, define
ti := min
{
s ∈ {ti−1 + 1, . . . , T} : ∃ Ω
′ ⊆ Ei−1 s.t. P(Ω′) > 0,
lim sup
m→∞
‖ψm,(i−1)s (ω)‖ =∞ for a.e. ω ∈ Ω
′
}
,
and
Ei :=
{
ω ∈ Ei−1 : lim sup
m→∞
‖ψ
m,(i−1)
ti
(ω)‖ =∞}.
Next, apply Lemma 3.6 to ψm,(i): there exists a strictly increasing sequence of positive,
integer-valued, Fti−1-measurable random variables τ
m
i such that
{τ1i (ω), τ
2
i (ω), . . . } ⊆ · · · ⊆ {τ
1
0 (ω), τ
2
0 (ω), . . . }, a.e. ω ∈ Ω, (22)
the sequence ψ
τmi ,(i−1)
ti
satisfies
lim
m→∞
‖ψ
τmi (ω),(i−1)
ti
(ω)‖ =∞, a.e. ω ∈ Ei, (23)
and the sequence ψm,(i) defined as
ψm,(i)s := 1Ei
ψ
τmi ,(i−1)
s
‖ψ
τmi ,(i−1)
ti
‖
, s ∈ T ∗, (24)
satisfies limm ψ
m,(i)
s (ω) = 0 for s = 1, . . . , ti − 1, for a.e. ω ∈ Ω.
Repeat: i→ i+ 1.
Given this construction, we define
βmi (ω) := τi ◦ τi+1 ◦ · · · ◦ τ
m
k (ω), i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, ω ∈ Ω,
Um(ω) : = ‖φ
βm0 (ω)
t0
(ω)‖
k∏
i=1
‖ψ
βmi (ω),(i−1)
ti
(ω)‖, ω ∈ Ω.
We make the following observations on this construction:
(i) The construction always produces a sequence ϕm such that lim supm ‖ϕ
m
s ‖ < ∞ for
all s ∈ T ∗. Indeed, if ti = T for some i = 1, . . . , T , then limm ψ
m,(i)
s (ω) = 0 for
s = 1, . . . , T − 1, for a.e. ω ∈ Ω, and limm ‖ψ
m,(i)
T (ω)‖ = 1Ei(ω), for a.e. ω ∈ Ω. The
sequence ψm,(i) clearly satisfies lim supm ‖ψ
m,(i)
s ‖ <∞ for all s ∈ T ∗.
(ii) We have that ϕms ∈ L
0(Ω,Ftk−1,P,R
N ) for s = 1, . . . , tk − 1, and
ϕms ∈ L
0(Ω,Fs−1,P,R
N ) for s = tk, . . . , T . Hence, the sequence ϕ
m is not a sequence
of predictable processes. However, the limit of any a.s. convergent subsequence of ϕm
is predictable because ϕms converges a.s. to 0 for s = 1, . . . , tk − 1.
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(iii) Ek ⊆ · · · ⊆ E0, and P(Ek) > 0.
(iv) Any a.s. convergent subsequence of ϕm converges a.s. to a nonzero process since
‖ϕmtk‖ converges a.s. to 1Ek , which is nonzero a.s. since P(E
k) > 0.
(v) From (21) and (24), we have ϕms = 1Eφ
βm0
s /Um for all s ∈ T ∗, where E :=
⋂k
i=1E
i.
Because Ek ⊆ · · · ⊆ E0,
ϕms = 1Ek
φ
βm0
s
Um
, s ∈ T ∗. (25)
(vi) Um(ω) diverges for a.e. ω ∈ Ek since (20), (22), and (23) hold.
Step 1b: By the previous step, lim supm ‖ϕ
m
s ‖ < ∞ for all s ∈ T
∗. We apply Lemma 3.5
to ϕm to find a strictly increasing sequence of positive, integer-valued, FT−1-measurable
random variables ρm so that ϕρ
m
converges a.s. to some process ϕ such that3 ϕs ∈
L0(Ω,Ftk−1,P;R
N ) for s = 1, . . . , tk − 1, and ϕs ∈ L
0(Ω,Fs−1,P;R
N ) for s = tk, . . . , T .
By observation (ii) in Step 1a, we have that ϕ is predictable.
Step 1c: We proceed by showing that NAEF implies P(E0) = 0. Towards this, we first
show that the process ϕ constructed in Step 1b satisfies F (ϕ) ∈ K. For the sake of notation,
we define ηm := βρ
m
0 . From (25), we have ϕ
ρm = 1Ekφ
ηm/Uρ
m
. Since 1Ek and U
ρm are
nonnegative, R-valued random variables,
1Ek
F (φη
m
)
Uρm
= F
(
1Ek
φη
m
Uρm
)
= F (ϕρ
m
). (26)
Because ϕρ
m
converges a.s. to ϕ, we may apply Lemma 2.1 to see that F (ϕρ
m
) converges
a.s. to F (ϕ). Since ϕ is predictable, we have from the definition of K that F (ϕ) ∈ K.
We proceed by showing that F (ϕ) ∈ L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R). Lets begin by defining X˜
m :=
Xη
m
/Uρ
m
and Z˜m := Zη
m
/Uρ
m
. From (19),
F (φη
m
) = Xη
m
+ Zη
m
. (27)
By multiplying both sides of (27) by 1Ek/U
ρm , we see from (26) that
F (ϕρ
m
) = 1Ek(X˜
m + Z˜m). (28)
The sequence Xm converges a.s. by assumption, so the sequence Xη
m
also converges a.s.
Recall that the sequence Um(ω) diverges4 for a.e. ω ∈ Ek, so Uρ
m
(ω) diverges for a.e.
ω ∈ Ek since {ρ1(ω), ρ2(ω), . . . , } ⊆ N for a.e. ω ∈ Ω. Hence, 1EkX˜
m converges a.s. to
0. Since F (ϕρ
m
) and 1EkX˜
m converge a.s., the sequence 1EkZ˜
m also converges a.s. to
some Z ∈ L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R). Thus, F (ϕ
ρm) converges a.s. to Z, which implies F (ϕ) ∈
L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R).
3See observation (ii) in Step 1a.
4See observations (vi) in Step 1a.
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Since F (ϕ) ∈ K, we immediately see that F (ϕ) ∈ K ∩ L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R). It is assumed
that NA is satisfied, so by Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3 we deduce that F (ϕ) = 0. We are supposing
that EF holds, so according to Lemma 3.2 we have ϕ = 0. This cannot happen given our
assumption that P(Ek) > 0 because5 ‖ϕtk‖ = 1Ek . Therefore, we must have that P(E
k) = 0.
This contradicts the construction in Step 1a, so P(E0) = 0.
Step 2: By the conclusion in Step 1, we obtain that lim supm ‖φ
m
s ‖ < ∞ for s ∈ T
∗.
By applying Lemma 3.5 to φm, we may find a strictly increasing sequence of positive,
integer-valued, FT−1-measurable random variables σ
m such that φσ
m
converges a.s. to
some predictable process φ.
By Lemma 2.1, the sequence F (φσ
m
) converges a.s. to F (φ). Since φ ∈ P, we have
F (φ) ∈ K. Because Xm converges a.s. to X, the sequence Xσ
m
also converges a.s. to X.
From (19), it is true that Xσ
m
= F (φσ
m
)−Zσ
m
. Since Xσ
m
and F (φσ
m
) converges a.s., the
sequence Zσ
m
also converges a.s. Thus, F (φσ
m
)−Xσ
m
converges a.s. to some nonnegative
random variable Z := F (φ) − X, which gives us that X = F (φ) − Z. We conclude that
X ∈ K− L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R).
3.2 The First Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing
In this section, we formulate and prove a version of the First Fundamental Theorem of
Asset Pricing (FFTAP). We define the following set for convenience:
Z := {Q : Q ∼ P, P ask,∗, P bid,∗, Aask,∗, Abid,∗ are Q-integrable}.
We now define a risk-neutral measure in our context.
Definition 3.2. A probability measure Q is a risk-neutral measure if Q ∈ Z, and if
EQ[V
∗
T (φ)] ≤ 0 for all φ ∈ S such that φ
j is bounded a.s., for j ∈ J ∗, and V0(φ) = 0.
A natural question to ask is whether the expectation appearing in the definition above
exists. The following lemma shows that, indeed, it does.
Lemma 3.7. Suppose that Q ∈ Z, and let φ ∈ S be such that φj is bounded a.s., for j ∈ J ∗,
and V0(φ) = 0. Then V
∗
T (φ) is Q-integrable.
Proof. From the definition of Z, the processes P ask,∗, P bid,∗, Aask,∗, Abid,∗ are Q-integrable.
Because Q is equivalent to P, and since φj is bounded P-a.s. for j ∈ J ∗, we have that φj is
bounded Q-a.s. for j ∈ J ∗. Therefore, we see from Proposition 2.5 that EQ[|V
∗
T (φ)|] < ∞
holds.
Remark 3.3. For frictionless markets (P := P ask = P bid, A := Aask = Abid), a risk-neutral
measure is classically defined to be an equivalent probability measure such that the dis-
counted cumulative price process (Pt +
∑t
u=1∆Au)
T
u=0 is a martingale under Q. The
present definition of a risk-neutral coincides with this classic definition of a risk-neutral
5See observations (iv) in Step 1a.
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measure if the market is frictionless. Indeed, if there are no frictions the value process
satisfies V ∗T (−φ) = −V
∗
T (φ) for all trading strategies. Also, by Proposition 2.5, we have that
EQ[V
∗
T (φ)] = 0 for all φ ∈ S such that φ
j is bounded a.s. and V0(φ) = 0 for j ∈ J
∗ if and
only if
N∑
j=1
T∑
u=1
EQ
[
φjuEQ
[
∆
(
B−1u P
j
u +
u∑
w=1
B−1w ∆A
j
w
)∣∣∣Fu−1]
]
= 0
for all φ ∈ S such that φj is bounded a.s., for j ∈ J ∗.
The next lemma provides a mathematically convenient condition that is equivalent to NA.
Lemma 3.8. The no-arbitrage condition (NA) is satisfied if and only if for each φ ∈ S
such that φj is bounded a.s. for j ∈ J ∗, V0(φ) = 0, and VT (φ) ≥ 0, we have VT (φ) = 0.
Proof. Necessity holds immediately, so we only show sufficiency. Let φ ∈ S be a trading
strategy so that V0(φ) = 0 and VT (φ) ≥ 0. We will show that VT (φ) = 0.
First, define the Ft−1 measurable set Ω
m,j
t := {ω ∈ Ω : |φ
j
t (ω)| ≤ m} for m ∈ N, t ∈ T
∗,
and j ∈ J ∗, and define the sequence of trading strategies ψm as ψm,jt := 1Ωm,jt
φjt for t ∈ T
∗
and j ∈ J ∗, where ψm,0 is chosen so that ψm is self-financing and V0(ψ
m) = 0. Since 1
Ωm,jt
converges a.s. to 1 for all t ∈ T ∗ and j ∈ J ∗, we have that ψm,jt converges a.s. to φ
j
t for all
t ∈ T ∗ and j ∈ J ∗.
Now we prove that V0(ψ
m) converges a.s. to V0(φ). Towards this, we first show that
ψm,j1 converges a.s. to φ
j
1 for all j ∈ J . By the definition of V0(ψ
m),
V0(ψ
m) = ψm,01 +
N∑
j=1
ψm,j1
(
1
{ψm,j1 ≥0}
P ask,j0 + 1{ψm,j1 <0}
P bid,j0
)
.
Since ψm,0 is chosen so that V0(ψ
m) = 0, we have
ψm,01 = −
N∑
j=1
ψm,j1
(
1
{ψm,j1 ≥0}
P ask,j0 + 1{ψm,j1 <0}
P bid,j0
)
.
The sequence ψm,j1 converges a.s. to φ
j
1 for all j ∈ J
∗, so by Lemma 2.1 the sequence ψm,01
converges a.s. to
−
N∑
j=1
φj1
(
1
{φj1≥0}
P ask,j0 + 1{φj1<0}
P bid,j0
)
.
However, V0(φ) = 0, so ψ
m,0
1 converges a.s. to φ
0
1 Thus, ψ
m,j
1 converges a.s. to φ
j
1 for all
j ∈ J . By Lemma 2.1, we have that V0(ψ
m) converges to V0(φ).
According to Lemma 2.1, V ∗T (ψ
m) converges a.s. to V ∗T (φ) since ψ
m,j
t converges a.s. to
φjt for all t ∈ T
∗ and j ∈ J ∗.
Next, since ψm is self-financing and ψm,j is bounded a.s. for all j ∈ J ∗ and all m ∈ N,
we obtain
V0(ψ
m) = 0, V ∗T (ψ
m) ≥ 0 =⇒ V ∗T (ψ
m) = 0, m ∈ N.
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Since V0(ψ
m) converges a.s. to V0(φ), and V
∗
T (ψ
m) converges a.s. to V ∗T (φ) we have
V0(φ) = 0, VT (φ) ≥ 0 =⇒ VT (φ) = 0.
Since V0(φ) = 0 and VT (φ) ≥ 0, we conclude that VT (φ) = 0, so NA holds.
Next, we recall the well-known Kreps-Yan Theorem. It was first proved by Yan [Yan80],
and then obtained independently by Kreps [Kre81] in the context of financial mathematics.
For a proof of the version presented in this paper, see Schachermayer [Sch92]. Theorem 3.2
and the Kreps-Yan Theorem will essentially imply the FFTAP (Theorem 3.5).
Theorem 3.4 (Kreps-Yan). Let C be a closed convex cone in L1(Ω,F ,P;R) containing
L1−(Ω,F ,P;R) such that C ∩ L
1
+(Ω,F ,P;R) = {0}. Then there exists a functional f ∈
L∞(Ω,F ,P;R) such that, for each h ∈ L1+(Ω,F ,P;R) with h 6= 0, we have that EP[fh] > 0
and EP[fg] ≤ 0 for any g ∈ C.
We are now ready prove the following version of the FFTAP.
Theorem 3.5 (First Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing). The following conditions
are equivalent:
(i) The no-arbitrage condition under the efficient friction assumption (NAEF) is satis-
fied.
(ii) There exists a risk-neutral measure.
(iii) There exists a risk-neutral measure Q so that dQ/dP ∈ L∞(Ω,FT ,P;R).
Proof. In order to prove these equivalences, we show that (ii) ⇒ (i), (i) ⇒ (iii), and
(iii)⇒ (ii). The implication (iii)⇒ (ii) is immediate, so we only show the remaining two.
(ii) ⇒ (i): We prove by contradiction. Assume there exists a risk-neutral measure Q,
and that NA does not hold. By Lemma 3.8, there exists φ ∈ S so that φj is bounded a.s.,
for j ∈ J ∗, V0(φ) = 0, V
∗
T (φ) ≥ 0, and P(V
∗
T (φ)(ω) > 0) > 0. Since Q is equivalent to P,
we have V0(φ) = 0, V
∗
T (φ) ≥ 0 Q-a.s., and Q(V
∗
T (φ)(ω) > 0) > 0. So EQ[V
∗
T (φ)] > 0, which
contradicts that Q is risk-neutral. Hence, NA holds.
(i) ⇒ (iii): We first construct a probability measure P˜ satisfying P˜ ∈ Z and dP˜/dP ∈
L∞(Ω,FT ,P;R). Towards this, let us define the FT -measurable weight function
w := 1 +
T∑
u=0
‖P ask,∗u ‖+
T∑
u=0
‖P bid,∗u ‖+
T∑
u=1
‖Aask,∗u ‖+
T∑
u=1
‖Abid,∗u ‖, (29)
and let P˜ be the measure on FT with Radon-Nikody´m derivative dP˜/dP = c˜/w, where
c˜ is an appropriate normalizing constant. We see that P˜ is equivalent to P, and dP˜/dP ∈
L∞(Ω,FT ,P;R). By the choice of the weight function w, the processes P
ask,∗, P bid,∗, Aask,∗,
Abid,∗ are P˜-integrable. Thus, P˜ ∈ Z.
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Next, since P˜ is equivalent to P, it follows that
(
K−L0+(Ω,FT , P˜ ;R)
)
∩L0+(Ω,FT , P˜ ;R) =
{0} by Lemma 3.1, the set K− L0+(Ω,FT , P˜ ;R) is P˜-closed according to Theorem 3.2, and
K − L0+(Ω,FT , P˜ ;R) is a convex cone by Lemma 2.2.
Let us now consider the set C :=
(
K − L0+(Ω,FT , P˜ ;R)
)
∩ L1(Ω,FT , P˜ ;R). We observe
the following that C ∩L1+(Ω,FT , P˜ ;R) = {0}, C is a convex cone, and C ⊇ L
1
−(Ω,FT , P˜ ;R).
Moreover, since convergence in L1(Ω,FT , P˜ ;R) implies convergence in measure P˜, we have
that C is closed in L1(Ω,FT , P˜ ;R).
Thus, according to Theorem 3.4, there exists a strictly positive functional6
f ∈ L∞(Ω,FT , P˜ ;R) such that EP˜[Kf ] ≤ 0 for all K ∈ C. Because 0 ∈ L
0
+(Ω,FT , P˜ ;R), it
follows from the definition of C that
E
P˜
[Kf ] ≤ 0, K ∈ K ∩ L1(Ω,FT , P˜ ;R).
By the definition of K, this implies that E
P˜
[V ∗T (φ)f ] ≤ 0 for all φ ∈ S such that V0(φ) = 0
and V ∗T (φ) ∈ L
1(Ω,FT , P˜ ;R). In particular, EP˜[V
∗
T (φ)f ] ≤ 0 for all φ ∈ S such that φ
j is
bounded a.s., for j ∈ J ∗, V0(φ) = 0, and V
∗
T (φ) ∈ L
1(Ω,FT , P˜ ;R). Since P˜ ∈ Z, we obtain
from Lemma 3.7 that V ∗T (φ) is P˜-integrable. Thus, EP˜[V
∗
T (φ)f ] ≤ 0 for all φ ∈ S such that
φj is bounded a.s., for j ∈ J ∗, and V0(φ) = 0.
We proceed by constructing a risk-neutral measure. Let Q be the measure on FT with
Radon-Nikody´m derivative dQ/dP˜ := cf , where c is an appropriate normalizing constant.
Because f is a strictly positive functional in L∞(Ω,FT , P˜ ;R), we have that Q is equivalent
to P˜. Since P˜ is equivalent to P, it follows that Q is equivalent to P. Also,
dQ
dP
=
dQ
dP˜
dP˜
dP
= cc˜
f
w
. (30)
Thus, since w ≥ 1 and f ∈ L∞(Ω,FT , P˜ ;R), we have dQ/dP ∈ L
∞(Ω,FT , P˜;R). This
gives us dQ/dP ∈ L∞(Ω,FT ,P;R) since P˜ is equivalent to P. Moreover, we note that the
processes P ask,∗, P bid,∗, Aask,∗, Abid,∗ are Q-integrable. Hence, Q ∈ Z. We conclude that Q
is a risk-neutral measure since EQ[V
∗
T (φ)] = c EP˜[V
∗
T (φ)f ] ≤ 0 for all φ ∈ S such that φ
j is
bounded a.s., for j ∈ J ∗, and V0(φ) = 0.
Remark 3.6.
(i) Note that EF is not needed to prove the implication (ii)⇒ (i).
(ii) In practice, it is typically required for a market model to satisfy NA. According to
Theorem 3.5, it is enough to check that there exists a risk-neutral measure. However,
this is not straightforward because it has to be verified whether there exists a prob-
ability measure Q ∈ Z so that EQ[V
∗
T (φ)] ≤ 0 for all φ ∈ S so that φ
j is bounded
a.s., for j ∈ J ∗, and V0(φ) = 0. We will show in the following section that consistent
pricing systems help solve this issue (see Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 4.3).
6For each h ∈ L1+(Ω,FT , P˜ ;R) with h 6= 0, we have EP˜[fh] > 0.
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4 Consistent pricing systems
Consistent pricing systems (CPSs) are instrumental in the theory of arbitrage in markets
with transaction costs—they provide a bridge between martingale theory in the theory
of arbitrage in frictionless markets and more general concepts in theory of arbitrage in
markets with transaction costs. Essentially, CPSs are interpreted as corresponding auxiliary
frictionless markets. They are very useful from the practical point of view because they
provide a straightforward way to verify whether a financial market model satisfies NA. In
this section, we explore the relationship between CPSs and NA.
We begin by defining a CPS in our context.
Definition 4.1. A consistent pricing system (CPS) corresponding to the market
(B,P ask, P bid, Aask, Abid) is a quadruplet {Q, P,A,M} consisting of
(i) a probability measure Q ∈ Z;
(ii) an adapted process P satisfying P bid,∗ ≤ P ≤ P ask,∗;
(iii) an adapted process A satisfying Aask,∗ ≤ A ≤ Abid,∗;
(iv) a martingale M under Q satisfying Mt = Pt +
∑t
u=1Au for all t ∈ T .
Remark 4.1. Since our market is fixed throughout the paper, we shall simply refer to
{Q, P,A,M} as a CPS, rather than a CPS corresponding to the market
(B,P ask, P bid, Aask, Abid).
For a CPS {Q, P,A,M}, the process P is interpreted as the corresponding auxiliary
frictionless ex-dividend price process, and the process A has the interpretation of the cor-
responding auxiliary frictionless cumulative dividend process, whereas M is viewed as the
corresponding auxiliary frictionless cumulative price process.
The next result establishes a relationship between NA and CPSs in our context.
Proposition 4.2. If there exists a consistent pricing system (CPS), then the no-arbitrage
condition (NA) is satisfied.
Proof. Suppose there exists a CPS, call it {Q, P,A,M}, and suppose φ ∈ S is a trading
strategy such that φj is bounded a.s., for j ∈ J ∗, and V0(φ) = 0. In view of Proposition 2.5,
and because P bid ≤ P ≤ P ask and Aask ≤ A ≤ Abid, we deduce that
V ∗T (φ) ≤
N∑
j=1
(
φjTP
j
T +
T∑
u=1
(−∆φjuP
j
u−1 + φ
j
uA
j
u)
)
.
Since M = P +
∑·
u=1Au is a martingale under Q, and because φ
j is bounded a.s., for
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j ∈ J ∗, we have
EQ[V
∗
T (φ)] ≤
N∑
j=1
EQ
[
φjTP
j
T +
T∑
u=1
(−∆φjuP
j
u−1 + φ
j
uA
j
u)
]
=
N∑
j=1
T∑
u=1
EQ
[
∆φjuEQ
[
P jT +
T∑
w=1
Ajw − P
j
u−1 −
u−1∑
w=1
Ajw
∣∣∣Fu−1]
]
=
N∑
j=1
T∑
u=1
EQ
[
∆φjuEQ
[
M jT −M
j
u−1
∣∣∣Fu−1]
]
= 0.
Therefore Q is a risk-neutral measure. According to Theorem 3.5, NA holds.
At this point, a natural question to ask is whether there exists a CPS whenever NA is
satisfied. In general, this is still an open question. However, for the special case in which
there are no transaction costs in the dividends paid by the securities, Aask = Abid, will show
in Theorem 4.3 that there exists a CPS if and only if NAEF is satisfied.
Proposition 4.2 is important from the modeling point of view because it provides a
sufficient condition for a model to satisfy NA. In the next example, we construct a model
for which there exists a CPS.
Example 4.1. Lets consider the CDS specified in Example 2.1. Recall that the cumulative
dividend processes Aask and Abid corresponding to the CDS are defined as
Aaskt := 1{τ≤t}δ − κ
ask
t∑
u=1
1{u<τ}, A
bid
t := 1{τ≤t}δ − κ
bid
t∑
u=1
1{u<τ}
for all t ∈ T ∗. Let us fix any probability measure Q equivalent to P. We postulate that the
ex-dividend prices P ask and P bid satisfy
P ask,∗t = EQ
[ T∑
u=t+1
Abid,∗u
∣∣∣Ft], P bid,∗t = EQ[ T∑
u=t+1
Aask,∗u
∣∣∣Ft],
for all t ∈ T ∗. By substituting Aask,∗ and Abid,∗ into the equations for P ask,∗ and P bid,∗
above, we see that
P ask,∗t = EQ
[
1{t<τ≤T}B
−1
τ δ − κ
bid
T∑
u=t+1
B−1u 1{u<τ}
∣∣∣Ft],
P bid,∗t = EQ
[
1{t<τ≤T}B
−1
τ δ − κ
ask
T∑
u=t+1
B−1u 1{u<τ}
∣∣∣Ft].
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For a fixed κ ∈ [κbid, κask], we define
At := B
−1
t
(
1{τ=t}δ − κ1{t<τ}
)
, t ∈ T ∗,
Pt := EQ
[ T∑
u=t+1
Au
∣∣∣Ft] = EQ[1{t<τ≤T}B−1τ δ − κ T∑
u=t+1
B−1u 1{u<τ}
∣∣∣Ft], t ∈ T ,
Mt := Pt +
t∑
u=1
Au, t ∈ T .
The quadruplet {Q, P,A,M} is a CPS. To see this, first observe that A and P are Q-
integrable since A is bounded Q-a.s. Thus, Q ∈ Z. Next, M satisfies
Mt = EQ
[
1{τ≤T}B
−1
τ δ − κ
T∑
u=1
B−1u 1{u<τ}
∣∣∣Ft], t ∈ T ,
soM is a Doob martingale under Q. Also, since κ ∈ [κbid, κask], we have Aask,∗ ≤ A ≤ Abid,∗
and P bid,∗ ≤ P ≤ P ask,∗. Thus, {Q, P,A,M} is a CPS. According to Proposition 4.2,
we may additionally conclude that the financial market model {B,P ask, P bid, Aask, Abid}
satisfies NA.
4.1 Consistent pricing systems under the assumption Aask = Abid
In this section we investigate the relationship between risk-neutral measures and CPSs under
the assumption Aask = Abid. Let us denote by A the process Aask. We begin by proving
two preliminary lemmas that hold in general (without the assumption Aask = Abid).
Lemma 4.1. If Q is a risk-neutral measure, then
P bid,j,∗σ1 ≤ EQ
[
P ask,j,∗σ2 +
σ2∑
u=σ1+1
Abid,j,∗u
∣∣∣Fσ1], P ask,j,∗σ1 ≥ EQ[P bid,j,∗σ2 + σ2∑
u=σ1+1
Aask,j,∗u
∣∣∣Fσ1],
for all j ∈ J ∗ and stopping times 0 ≤ σ1 < σ2 ≤ T .
Proof. Suppose Q is a risk-neutral measure. For stopping times 0 ≤ σ1 < σ2 ≤ T and
random variables ξσ1 ∈ L
∞(Ω,Fσ1 ,P; R
N ), we define the trading strategy
θ(σ1, σ2, ξσ1) := (θ
0
t (σ1, σ2, ξσ1), 1{σ1+1≤t≤σ2}ξ
1
σ1
, . . . , 1{σ1+1≤t≤σ2}ξ
N
σ1
)Tt=1,
where θ0(σ1, σ2, ξσ1) is chosen such that θ(σ1, σ2, ξσ1) is self-financing and
V0(θ(σ1, σ2, ξσ1)) = 0. Due to Proposition 2.5, the value process associated with θ satisfies
V ∗T (θ(σ1, σ2, ξσ1)) =
N∑
j=1
1
{ξjσ1≥0}
ξjσ1
(
P bid,j,∗σ2 +
σ2∑
u=σ1+1
Aask,j,∗u − P
ask,j,∗
σ1
)
+
N∑
j=1
1
{ξjσ1<0}
ξjσ1
(
P ask,j,∗σ2 +
σ2∑
u=σ1+1
Abid,j,∗u − P
bid,j,∗
σ1
)
.
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Since Q is a risk-neutral measure, we have EQ[V
∗
T (θ(σ1, σ2, ξσ1))] ≤ 0 for all stopping times
0 ≤ σ1 < σ2 ≤ T and ξσ1 ∈ L
∞(Ω,Fσ1 ,P; R
N ). Hence, we are able to obtain
EQ
[ N∑
j=1
1
{ξjσ1≥0}
ξjσ1
(
P bid,j,∗σ2 +
σ2∑
u=σ1+1
Aask,j,∗u − P
ask,j,∗
σ1
)
+
N∑
j=1
1
{ξjσ1<0}
ξjσ1
(
P ask,j,∗σ2 +
σ2∑
u=σ1+1
Abid,j,∗u − P
bid,j,∗
σ1
)]
≤ 0,
for all stopping times 0 ≤ σ1 < σ2 ≤ T and random variables ξσ1 ∈ L
∞(Ω,Fσ1 ,P; R
N). By
the tower property of conditional expectations, we get that
EQ
[
N∑
j=1
1
{ξjσ1≥0}
ξjσ1EQ
[
P bid,j,∗σ2 +
σ2∑
u=σ1+1
Aask,j,∗u − P
ask,j,∗
σ1
∣∣∣Fσ1]
+
N∑
j=1
1
{ξjσ1<0}
ξjσ1EQ
[
P ask,j,∗σ2 +
σ2∑
u=σ1+1
Abid,j,∗u − P
bid,j,∗
σ1
∣∣∣Fσ1]
]
≤ 0.
for all stopping times 0 ≤ σ1 < σ2 ≤ T and random variables ξσ1 ∈ L
∞(Ω,Fσ1 ,P; R
N ).
This implies that the claim is satisfied.
The next result is motivated by Theorem 4.5 in Cherny [Che07]. We will denote by Tt
the set of stopping times in {t, t+ 1, . . . , T}, for all t ∈ T .
Lemma 4.2. Suppose Q is a risk-neutral measure, and let
Xb,js := ess sup
σ∈Ts
EQ
[
P bid,j,∗σ +
σ∑
u=1
Aask,j,∗u
∣∣∣Fs],
Xa,js := ess inf
σ∈Ts
EQ
[
P ask,j,∗σ +
σ∑
u=1
Abid,j,∗u
∣∣∣Fs],
for all j ∈ J ∗ and s ∈ T . Then Xb is a supermartingale and Xa is a submartingale, both
under Q, and satisfy Xb ≤ Xa.
Proof. Let us fix j ∈ J ∗. The processes Xb,j and Xa,j are Snell envelopes, so Xa,j is a
supermartingale and Xb.j is a submartingale, both under Q (see for instance, Fo¨llmer and
Schied [FS04]).
We now show that Xb,j ≤ Xa,j . Let us define the process
Xjt := EQ
[
P bid,j,∗τ1 +
τ1∑
u=1
Aask,j,∗u
∣∣∣Ft]− EQ[P ask,j,∗τ2 + τ2∑
u=1
Abid,j,∗u
∣∣∣Ft], t ∈ T .
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For any stopping times τ1, τ2 ∈ Tt, we see that
Xjt = EQ
[
EQ
[
P bid,j,∗τ1 +
τ1∑
u=1
Aask,j,∗u − P
ask,j,∗
τ2
−
τ2∑
u=1
Abid,j,∗u
∣∣Fτ1∧τ2]∣∣∣Ft]
= EQ
[
1{τ1≤τ2}
(
P bid,j,∗τ1 +
τ1∑
u=1
Aask,j,∗u − EQ
[
P ask,j,∗τ2 +
τ2∑
u=1
Abid,j,∗u
∣∣∣Fτ1])∣∣∣Ft]
+ EQ
[
1{τ1>τ2}
(
EQ
[
P bid,j,∗τ1 +
τ1∑
u=1
Aask,j,∗u
∣∣∣Fτ2]− P ask,j,∗τ2 − τ2∑
u=1
Abid,j,∗u
)∣∣∣Ft].
After rearranging terms, we deduce that
Xjt = EQ
[
1{τ1≤τ2}P
bid,j,∗
τ1
+
τ1∑
u=1
(Aask,j,∗u −A
bid,j,∗
u )
− 1{τ1≤τ2}EQ
[
P ask,j,∗τ2 +
τ2∑
u=τ1+1
Abid,j,∗u
∣∣∣Fτ1]∣∣∣Ft]
+ EQ
[
1{τ1>τ2}EQ
[
P bid,j,∗τ1 +
τ1∑
u=τ2+1
Aask,j,∗u
∣∣∣Fτ2]
− 1{τ1>τ2}(P
ask,j,∗
τ2
+
τ2∑
u=1
(Abid,j,∗u −A
ask,j,∗
u ))
∣∣∣Ft].
Because Aask,∗ ≤ Abid,∗, we are able to obtain
Xjt ≤ EQ
[
1{τ1≤τ2}
(
P bid,j,∗τ1 − EQ
[
P ask,j,∗τ2 +
τ2∑
u=τ1+1
Abid,j,∗u
∣∣∣Fτ1])∣∣∣Ft]
+ EQ
[
1{τ1>τ2}
(
EQ
[
P bid,j,∗τ1 +
τ1∑
u=τ2+1
Aask,j,∗u
∣∣∣Fτ2]− P ask,j,∗τ2 )∣∣∣Ft]. (31)
Since Q is a risk-neutral measure, we see from Lemma 4.1 and (31) that Xjt ≤ 0. The
stopping times τ1 and τ2 are arbitrary in the definition of X
j , so we conclude that Xb,j ≤
Xa,j .
The next theorem gives sufficient and necessary conditions for there to exist a CPS (cf.
Cherny [Che07]; Kabanov et al. [KRS02]; Schachermayer [Sch04]).
Theorem 4.3. Under the assumption that Aask = Abid, there exists a consistent pric-
ing system (CPS) if and only if the no-arbitrage condition under the efficient condition
(NAEF) is satisfied.
Proof. Necessity is shown in Proposition 4.2, so we only prove sufficiency. Suppose that
NAEF is satisfied. According to Theorem 3.5, there exists a risk-neutral measure Q. By
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Lemma 4.1,
P bid,j,∗σ1 ≤ EQ
[
P ask,j,∗σ2 +
σ2∑
u=σ1+1
Aj,∗u
∣∣∣Fσ1], P ask,j,∗σ1 ≥ EQ[P bid,j,∗σ2 + σ2∑
u=σ1+1
Aj,∗u
∣∣∣Fσ1],
for all j ∈ J ∗ and stopping times 0 ≤ σ1 < σ2 ≤ T . Now, let us define the processes
Y b,jt := ess sup
σ∈Tt
EQ
[
P bid,j,∗σ +
σ∑
u=t+1
Aj,∗u
∣∣∣Ft],
Y a,jt := ess inf
σ∈Tt
EQ
[
P ask,j,∗σ +
σ∑
u=t+1
Aj,∗u
∣∣∣Ft],
Xb,jt := Y
b,j
t +
t∑
u=1
Aj,∗t , X
a,j
t := Y
a,j
t +
t∑
u=1
Aj,∗t , (32)
for all t ∈ T and j ∈ J ∗. From Lemma 4.2, we know that under Q the process Xa is a
submartingale and the process Xb is a supermartingale, and that they satisfy Xb ≤ Xa.
For t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 and j ∈ J ∗, recursively define
M j0 := Y
a,j
0 , P
j
0 := Y
a,j
0 , P
j
t+1 := λ
j
tY
a,j
t+1 + (1− λ
j
t )Y
b,j
t+1, (33)
M jt+1 := P
j
t+1 +
t+1∑
u=1
Aju,
where λjt satisfies
λjt =

M jt − EQ[X
b,j
t+1|Ft]
EQ[X
a,j
t+1 −X
b,j
t+1|Ft]
, if EQ[X
a,j
t+1|Ft] 6= EQ[X
b,j
t+1|Ft],
1
2
, otherwise.
(34)
Lets fix j ∈ J ∗ for the rest of the proof.
Step 1: In this step, we show that the processes above are well defined and adapted. First,
note that P0 and M0 are well defined, and that, by (34),
λj0 =
M j0 − EQ[X
b,j
1 |F0]
EQ[X
a,j
1 −X
b,j
1 |F0]
, or λj0 =
1
2
.
Thus, λj0 is well defined and F0-measurable. Next, we compute P
j
1 and M
j
1 , and conse-
quently we compute λj1; all of them being F1-measurable. Inductively, we see that P
j
t , M
j
t ,
and λjt , for t = 2, . . . , T are well defined and Ft-measurable.
Step 2: We inductively show that λjt ∈ [0, 1] for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1. We first show that
λj0 ∈ [0, 1]. If EQ[X
a,j
1 − X
b,j
1 |F0] = 0, then λ
j
0 ∈ [0, 1] automatically, so suppose that
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EQ[X
a,j
1 − X
b,j
1 |F0] > 0. Now, by the definition of M
j , we have that M j0 = X
a,j
0 , so (34)
gives that
λj0 =
Xa,j0 − EQ[X
b,j
1 |F0]
EQ[X
a,j
1 −X
b,j
1 |F0]
. (35)
The process Xa,j is a submartingale under Q, so it immediately follows that λj0 ≤ 1. On
the other hand, since Xb,j is a supermartingale under Q,
λj0 ≥
Xa,j0 −X
b,j
0
EQ[X
a,j
1 −X
b,j
1 |F0]
.
Because Xa,j0 ≥ X
b,j
0 , we deduce that λ
j
0 ≥ 0.
Suppose that λjt ∈ [0, 1] for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 2. We now prove that λ
j
T−1 ∈ [0, 1]. If
EQ[X
a,j
T − X
b,j
T |FT−1] = 0, then λ
j
T−1 = 1/2, so assume that EQ[X
a,j
T − X
b,j
T |FT−1] > 0.
According to (34) and the definition of M j , we have that
λjT−1 =
λjT−2X
a,j
T−1 + (1− λ
j
T−2)X
b,j
T−1 − EQ[X
b,j
T |FT−1]
EQ[X
a,j
T −X
b,j
T |FT−1]
. (36)
Since λjT−2 ≤ 1, and because X
b,j is a supermartingale under Q, we have that
λjT−1 ≥
λjT−2(X
a,j
T−1 −X
b,j
T−1)
EQ[X
a,j
T −X
b,j
T |FT−1]
.
Because Xa,j ≥ Xb,j , we arrive at λjT−1 ≥ 0. Now, since X
a,j
T−1 ≥ X
b,j
T−1 and λ
j
T−2 ≤ 1, we
see from (36) that
λjT−1 ≤
Xa,jT−1 − EQ[X
b,j
T |FT−1]
EQ[X
a,j
T −X
b,j
T |FT−1]
.
The process Xa,j is a submartingale under Q, so it follows that λjT−1 ≤ 1. We conclude
that λjt ∈ [0, 1] for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1.
Step 3: Next, we show that M is a martingale under Q. First we note that by (32) and
(33) we have
M jt+1 = λ
j
tX
a,j
t+1 + (1− λ
j
t )X
b,j
t+1. (37)
From here, the Q-integrability of M j follows from Q-integrability of Xa,j ,Xb,j and bound-
edness of λj. From (34) and (37), we get that EQ[M
j
t+1|Ft] = M
j
t , for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1.
Hence, M j is a martingale under Q.
Step 4: We continue by showing that P j satisfies P bid,∗,j ≤ P j ≤ P ask,∗,j. Let us first
show that P bid,j0 ≤ P
j
0 ≤ P
ask,j
0 . By definition of P
j
0 , we have that P
j
0 = Y
a,j
0 , and by (32)
we see that Y a,j0 = X
a,j
0 . Therefore, the claim holds since P
bid,j
0 ≤ X
a,j
0 ≤ P
ask,j
0 .
We proceed by proving that P bid,jt ≤ P
j
t ≤ P
ask,j
t for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. Towards this,
let t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. By the definition of P jt , we have P
j
t = λ
j
t−1Y
a,j
t + (1 − λ
j
t−1)Y
b,j
t . From
(32), it is true that Xa,jt ≥ X
b,j
t if and only if Y
a,j
t ≥ Y
b,j
t . Also, since t ∈ Tt, we see from
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(32) that Y b,jt ≥ P
bid,j,∗
t and Y
a,j
t ≤ P
ask,j
t . According to Step 1, λ
j
t−1 ∈ [0, 1]. So, putting
everything together, we obtain
P bid,jt ≤ Y
b,j
t ≤ P
j
t ≤ Y
a,j
t ≤ P
ask,j
t .
We conclude that {Q, P,A,M} is a CPS.
5 Superhedging and subhedging theorem
In this section, we define the superhedging ask and subhedging bid prices for a dividend-
paying contingent claim, and then we provide an important representation theorem for these
prices. The representation theorem is important because it provides an alternative way of
computing the superhedging ask and superhedging bid prices. Also, it is an application
of the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing: the theorem relates how the no-arbitrage
condition (and hence the existence of risk-neutral measures) is related to the pricing of
contingent claims.
For results related to this topic, both for discrete-time and continuous-time markets with
transaction costs, we refer to, among others, Soner, Shreve, and Cvitanic [SSC95]; Levental
and Skorohod [LS97]; Cvitanic, Pham, and Touzi [CPT99]; Touzi [Tou99]; Bouchard and
Touzi [BT00]; Kabanov, Ra´sonyi, and Stricker [KRS02]; Schachermayer [Sch04]; Campi and
Schachermayer [CS06]; Cherny [Che07]; Pennanen [Pen11d, Pen11a, Pen11b, Pen11c]. Our
contribution to this literature is that we consider dividend-paying securities such as swap
contracts as hedging securities.
A contingent claim D is any a.s. bounded, R-valued, F-adapted process. Here, D
is interpreted as the spot cash flow process (not the cumulative cash flow process). We
remark that the boundedness assumption on contingent claims is satisfied for fixed income
securities.
Let us now define the set of self-financing trading strategies initiated at time t ∈
{0, 1, . . . , T − 1} with bounded components (j = 1, . . . , N) as
S(t) :=
{
φ ∈ S : φj is bounded a.s. for j ∈ J ∗, φs = 0 for all s ≤ t
}
,
and the set of attainable claims at zero cost initiated at time t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} as
K(t) :=
{
V ∗T (φ) : φ ∈ S(t) such that V0(φ) = 0
}
.
Remark 5.1.
(i) S(t) and K(t) are closed with respect to multiplication by random variables in
L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R).
7
(ii) S ⊃ S(0) ⊃ S(1) ⊃ · · · ⊃ S(T −1) and K ⊃ K(0) ⊃ K(1) ⊃ · · · ⊃ K(T −1). Moreover,
if Q is a risk-neutral measure, then EQ[K] ≤ 0 for all K ∈ K(t), for t = 0, 1, . . . , T −1.
7L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R) := {X ∈ L
∞(Ω,Ft,P;R) : X ≥ 0}.
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We proceed by defining the main objects of this section.
Definition 5.1. The discounted superhedging ask and subhedging bid prices of a contingent
claim D at time t ∈ {0, . . . , T −1} are defined as πaskt (D) := ess infW
a(t,D) and πbidt (D) :=
ess supWb(t,D), where
Wa(t,D) :=
{
W ∈ L0(Ω,Ft,P;R) : −W +
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u ∈ K(t)− L
0
+(Ω,FT ,P;R)
}
,
Wb(t,D) :=
{
W ∈ L0(Ω,Ft,P;R) :W −
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u ∈ K(t)− L
0
+(Ω,FT ,P;R)
}
.
Note that πaskt (D) = −π
bid
t (−D) and
Wa(t,D) =
{
W ∈ L0(Ω,Ft,P;R) : ∃K ∈ K(t) such that
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u ≤ K +W
}
,
Wb(t,D) =
{
W ∈ L0(Ω,Ft,P;R) : ∃K ∈ K(t) such that −
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u ≤ K −W
}
.
Remark 5.2.
(i) For each t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}, the prices πaskt (D) and π
bid
t (D) have the following
interpretations: The price πaskt (D) is interpreted as the least discounted cash amount
W at time t so that the gain −W +
∑T
u=t+1D
∗
u can be superhedged at zero cost. On
the other hand, the random variable πbidt (D) is interpreted as the greatest discounted
cash amount W at time t so that the gain W −
∑T
u=t+1D
∗
u can be superhedged at
zero cost.
(ii) In view of (i) above, it is unreasonable for the discounted ex-dividend ask price at
time t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} of a contingent claim D to be a.s. greater than πaskt (D),
and for the ex-dividend bid price at time t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} of a contingent claim
D to be a.s. less than πbidt (D).
(iii) Direction of trade matters: a market participant can buy a contingent claim D at
price πaskt (D) and sell D at price π
bid
t (D). This is in contrast to frictionless markets,
where a contingent claim can be bought and sold at the same price.
(iv) The prices πaskt (D) and π
bid
t (D) satisfy π
ask
t (D) < ∞ and π
bid
t (D) > −∞. Indeed,
since 0 ∈ K(t), 1 ∈ L0++(Ω,Ft,P;R), and
∑T
u=t+1D
∗
u is a.s. bounded, say by M ,
we have that −M +
∑T
u=t+1D
∗
u ∈ L
0
−(Ω,FT ,P;R). Thus, π
ask
t (D) ≤ M . Similarly,
πbidt (D) ≥ −M .
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Next, we define the sets of extended attainable claims initiated at time t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}
associated with cash amount W ∈ L0(Ω,Ft,P;R):
Ka(t,W ) := K(t) +
{
ξ
(
−W +
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
)
: ξ ∈ L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R)
}
,
Kb(t,W ) := K(t) +
{
ξ
(
W −
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
)
: ξ ∈ L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R)
}
.
Remark 5.3.
(i) The sets Ka(t,W ) and Kb(t,W ) are closed with respect to multiplication by random
variables in the set L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R), and in view of Lemma 2.2 they are convex cones.
Also, K(t) ⊂ Ka(t,W ) ∩ Kb(t,W ) since 0 ∈ L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R).
(ii) In view of Proposition 2.5,{
ξ
(
− πaskt (D) +
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
)
: ξ ∈ L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R)
}
(38)
is the set of all discounted terminal values associated with zero-cost, self-financing,
buy-and-hold trading strategies in the contingent claim D with discounted ex-dividend
ask price πaskt (D). On the other hand, the convex cone{
ξ
(
πbidt (D)−
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
)
: ξ ∈ L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R)
}
(39)
is the set of all discounted terminal values associated with zero-cost, self-financing,
sell-and-hold trading strategies in the contingent claim D with discounted ex-dividend
bid price πbidt (D).
We will now introduce definitions related to the sets of extended attainable claims. For
each t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T−1} andX ∈ L0(Ω,Ft,P;R), a probability measure Q is risk-neutral for
Ka(t,X) (Kb(t,X)) if Q ∈ Z and X is Q-integrable, and if EQ[K] ≤ 0 for all K ∈ K
a(t,X)
(K ∈ Kb(t,X)). We denote by Ra(t,X) (Rb(t,X)) the set of all risk-neutral measures Q for
Ka(t,X) (Kb(t,X)) so that dQ/dP ∈ L∞(Ω,FT ,P;R). We say that NA holds for K
a(t,X)
if Ka(t,X) ∩ L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R) = {0}, and likewise we say that NA holds for K
b(t,X) if
Kb(t,X) ∩ L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R) = {0}.
We will say that Ka(t,X) satisfies EF if{
(φ, ξ) ∈ S(t)× L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R) : V0(φ) = 0, V
∗
T (φ) + ξ
(
−X +
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
)
= 0
}
= {(0, 0)},
and say that Kb(t,X) satisfies EF if{
(φ, ξ) ∈ S(t)× L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R) : V0(φ) = 0, V
∗
T (φ) + ξ
(
X −
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
)
= 0
}
= {(0, 0)}.
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Remark 5.4. According to Lemma A.1, for any t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T−1} and X ∈ L0(Ω,Ft,P;P),
NAEF holds for Ka(t,X) (Kb(t,X)) if and only if Ra(t,X) 6= ∅ (Rb(t,X) 6= ∅).
For each t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}, we denote by R(t) the set of all risk-neutral measures for
K(t) so that dQ/dP ∈ L∞(Ω,FT ,P;R). Specifically, we define R(t) as
R(t) :=
{
Q ∈ Z : EQ[K] ≤ 0 for all K ∈ K(t)
}
.
We note thatRa(t,X)∪Rb(t,X) ⊆ R(t) for anyX ∈ L0(Ω,Ft,P;R) since K(t) ⊆ K
a(t,X)∩
Kb(t,X). Also, by the definition of a risk-neutral measure, it immediately follows that any
risk-neutral measure Q (as in Definition 3.2) satisfies Q ∈ R(t) for any t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T −1}.
The next technical lemma is needed to derive the dual representations of the superhedg-
ing ask and subhedging bid prices.
Lemma 5.1.
(i) For each t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T−1}, if R(t) 6= ∅ and Q ∈ R(t), then we have that EQ[K|Ft] ≤
0 Q-a.s. for all K ∈ K(t).
(ii) For each t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} and X ∈ L0(Ω,Ft,P;R), if R
a(t,X) 6= ∅ and Q ∈
Ra(t,X), then we have that EQ[K
a|Ft] ≤ 0 Q-a.s. for all K
a ∈ Ka(t,X).
(iii) For each t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} and X ∈ L0(Ω,Ft,P;R), if R
b(t,X) 6= ∅ and Q ∈
Rb(t,X), then we have that EQ[K
b|Ft] ≤ 0 Q-a.s. for all K
b ∈ Kb(t,X).
Proof. We only prove (i) and (ii). The proof of (iii) is very similar to the proof of (ii). We
fix t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} throughout the proof. Observe that in view of Lemma 3.7, we have
that for each Q ∈ R(t), any K ∈ K is Q-integrable. Moreover, because any contingent claim
is bounded a.s., for each Q ∈ Ra(t,X) (Q ∈ Rb(t,X)), any Ka ∈ Ka(t,X) (Kb ∈ Kb(t,W ))
is Q-integrable.
(i): We prove by contradiction. Let Q ∈ R(t), and suppose that there exists and K ∈ K(t)
such that EQ[K|Ft](ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω
t, where Ωt ⊆ Ω and P(Ωt) > 0. Note that
Ωt ∈ Ft since EQ[K|Ft] is Ft-measurable. By definition of K(t), there exists φ ∈ S(t)
with V0(φ) = 0 such that K = V
∗
T (φ). Define the process ψ := 1Ωtφ. Since Ω
t is Ft-
measurable and S(t) is closed with respect to multiplication by random variables in the set
L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R), we have that ψ ∈ S(t). Moreover, V0(ψ) = 1ΩtV0(φ) = 0 because 1Ωt is
nonnegative. Therefore, V ∗T (ψ) ∈ K(t). Since V
∗
T (ψ) = 1ΩtV
∗
T (φ) = 1ΩtK, we have that
EQ[V
∗
T (ψ)] = EQ[1ΩtEQ[K|Ft]] > 0, which contradicts that Q ∈ R(t).
(ii): As in (i), we will prove by contradiction. Let X ∈ L0(Ω,Ft,P;R) and Q ∈ R
a(t,X),
and assume that there exist K ∈ K(t) and ξ ∈ L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R) such that
−ξ(ω)X(ω) + EQ
[
K + ξ
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
∣∣∣Ft](ω) > 0, ω ∈ Ωt,
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where Ωt ⊆ Ω and P(Ωt) > 0. Since Ra(t,X) ⊂ R(t), we have that Q ∈ R(t). In view of
(i) above, it follows that EQ[K|Ft] ≤ 0. Thus,
−ξ(ω)X(ω) + ξ(ω)EQ
[ T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
∣∣∣Ft](ω) > 0, ω ∈ Ωt.
We proceed by defining the Ft-measurable random variable ϑ := 1Ωtξ. Because Ω
t ∈ Ft, it
is true that ϑ ∈ L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R). Now, by the tower property of conditional expectations
we obtain
EQ
[
ϑ
(
−X +
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
)]
= EQ
[
1Ωt
(
− ξX + ξEQ
[ T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
∣∣∣Ft])
]
> 0.
This contradicts that Q ∈ Ra(t,X) since ϑ ∈ L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R) and 0 ∈ K(t).
We are ready to prove the main result of this section: the dual representations of the
superhedging ask price and subhedging bid price.
Theorem 5.5. Suppose that the no-arbitrage condition under the efficient friction assump-
tion (NAEF) is satisfied. Let t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} and D be a contingent claim. Then the
following hold:
(i) The essential infimum of Wa(t,D) and the essential supremum of Wb(t,D) are at-
tained.
(ii) Suppose that for each t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} and X ∈ L0(Ω,Ft,P;R), the efficient
friction assumption (EF) holds for Ka(t,X) and Kb(t,X). Then the discounted su-
perhedging ask and subhedging bid prices for contingent claim D at time t satisfy
πaskt (D) = ess sup
Q∈R(t)
EQ
[ T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
∣∣∣Ft], (40)
πbidt (D) = ess inf
Q∈R(t)
EQ
[ T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
∣∣∣Ft]. (41)
Proof. Since πaskt (D) = −π
bid
t (−D) holds for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} and contingent claim D,
it suffices to show that the essential infimum of Wa(t,D) is attained and (40) holds. Let us
fix t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} throughout the proof.
We first prove (i). Let Wm be a sequence decreasing a.s. to πaskt (D), and fix K
m ∈
K(t) and Zm ∈ L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R) so that −W
m +
∑T
u=t+1D
∗
u = K
m − Zm. Since a.s.
converges implies convergence in probability, we see that the sequence Km−Zm converges
in probability to some Y . Due to Theorem 3.2, we have that K(t) − L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R) is P-
closed. Therefore, Y ∈ K(t)−L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R). This proves that −π
ask
t (D) +
∑T
u=t+1D
∗
u ∈
K(t) − L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R).
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Next, we show that (ii) holds. We begin by showing that
πaskt (D) ≥ ess sup
Q∈R(t)
EQ
[ T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
∣∣∣Ft]. (42)
By (i), we have that πaskt (D) ∈ W
a(t,D), so there exists K∗ ∈ K(t) so that
K∗ + πaskt (D)−
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u ≥ 0. (43)
We are assuming that NAEF is satisfied, so according to Theorem 3.5 there exists a risk-
neutral measure Q∗. Because any risk-neutral measure Q satisfies Q ∈ R(t), we obtain that
Q∗ ∈ R(t). By taking the conditional expectation with respect to Ft under Q
∗ of both sides
of the last inequality we deduce that
πaskt (D) + EQ∗[K
∗|Ft] ≥ EQ∗
[ T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
∣∣∣Ft].
According to part (i) of Lemma 5.1, we have that EQ∗[K
∗|Ft] ≤ 0. As a result, π
ask
t (D) ≥
EQ∗
[∑T
u=t+1D
∗
u
∣∣Ft]. Taking the essential supremum of both sides of the last inequality
over R(t) proves that (42) holds.
Next, we show that
πaskt (D) ≤ ess sup
Q∈R(t)
EQ
[ T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
∣∣∣Ft]. (44)
By (i), we have that πaskt (D) > −∞, so we may take X ∈ L
0(Ω,Ft,P;R) so that π
ask
t (D) >
X. We now prove by contradiction that NA holds for Kb(t,X). Towards this aim, we
assume that there exist K ∈ K(t), ξ ∈ L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R), and Ω
0 ⊆ Ω with P(Ω0) > 0 so that
K + ξ
(
X −
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
)
≥ 0 a.s., K + ξ
(
X −
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
)
> 0 a.s. on Ω0. (45)
Since NA is satisfied for underlying market K, we have from (45) that there exists Ω1 ⊆ Ω0
with P(Ω1) > 0 such that Ω1 ∈ Ft and ξ > 0 a.s. on Ω
1. Otherwise, our assumption that
NA holds is contradicted. Of course, if Ω1 ⊆ Ω0 is any set such that Ω1 ∈ Ft, P(Ω
1) > 0,
and ξ = 0 a.s. on Ω1, then 1Ω1K ∈ K(t) ∈ K satisfies 1Ω1K ≥ 0 a.s., and 1Ω1K > 0 a.s. on
Ω1, which violates that NA is satisfied.
Moreover, we observe that X −
∑T
u=t+1D
∗
u ≥ 0 a.s. on Ω
1. If there exists Ω2 ⊆ Ω1 with
P(Ω2) > 0 such that Ω2 ∈ Ft and X −
∑T
u=t+1D
∗
u < 0 a.s. on Ω
2, then from (45) we see
that K ≥ a.s., and K > 0 a.s. on Ω2, which contradicts that NA holds for K.
Now, let us define
X˜ := 1Ω1X + 1(Ω1)cπ
ask
t (D), K˜ := 1Ω1
K
supω∈Ω1{ξ(ω)}
+ 1(Ω1)cK
∗.
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From (43) we immediately have that
K˜ + X˜ −
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u = K
∗ + πaskt (D)−
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u ≥ 0 a.s. on (Ω
1)c.
On the other hand, from (45) and since X −
∑T
u=t+1D
∗
u ≥ 0 a.s. on Ω
1, we see that
K˜ + X˜ −
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u =
K
supω∈Ω1{ξ(ω)}
+X −
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u ≥ 0 a.s. on Ω
1.
Consequently, K˜ + X˜ −
∑T
u=t+1D
∗
u ≥ 0 a.s. on Ω. Now, since 0 ≤ 1/ supω∈Ω1{ξ(ω)} <∞,
and because K(t) is a convex cone that is closed with respect to multiplication by random
variables in L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R), we have that K˜ ∈ K(t). Therefore X˜ ∈ W
a(t,D). However,
since X˜ satisfies X˜ ≤ πaskt (D) and P(X˜ < π
ask
t (D)) > 0, we have that X˜ ∈ W
a(t,D)
contradicts πaskt (D) = ess infW
a(t,D). Thus, NA holds for Kb(t,X).
By assumption, EF holds for Kb(t,X), so NAEF is satisfied for Kb(t,X). According
to Lemma A.1 there exists Qˆ ∈ Rb(t,X). In view the claim (iii) in Lemma 5.1, we see that
ζX + E
Qˆ
[K|Ft] ≤ ζ EQˆ
[ T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
∣∣∣Ft], K ∈ K(t), ζ ∈ L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R).
Since 0 ∈ K(t) and 1 ∈ L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R), we obtain that X ≤ EQˆ
[∑T
u=t+1D
∗
u
∣∣Ft]. Now,
because Rb(t,X) ⊆ R(t), we have that Qˆ ∈ R(t). Hence,
X ≤ E
Qˆ
[ T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ sup
Q∈R(t)
EQ
[ T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
∣∣∣Ft]. (46)
The random variable X < πaskt (D) is arbitrary, so for any scalar ǫ > 0 we may take
X := πaskt (D)− ǫ. From (46), we see that
πaskt (D) ≤ sup
Q∈R(t)
EQ
[ T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
∣∣∣Ft]+ ǫ, ǫ > 0.
Letting ǫ approach zero shows that (44) holds. This completes the proof of (i).
Remark 5.6. An open question that remains is whether R(t) can be replaced by R(0)
in the representations in Theorem 5.5. In the arguments presented in this paper, it is
more convenient to work with R(t) than R(0) because K(t) is closed under multiplication
by random variables in L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R). In contrast, the set K(0) is only closed under
multiplication by random variables in L∞+ (Ω,F0,P;R).
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, no-arbitrage pricing theory is extended to dividend-paying securities in
discrete-time markets with transaction costs. A version of the Fundamental Theorem of
Asset Pricing is proved under the efficient friction assumption, and the representations for
the superhedging ask and subhedging bid prices are given. As usual, the proof of the Fun-
damental Theorem of Asset Pricing relies on showing that the set of all claims that can
be superhedged at zero cost is closed under convergence in probability. In the special case
when there are no transaction costs on the dividends paid by the security, the no-arbitrage
condition under the efficient friction assumption is proved to be equivalent to the existence
of a consistent pricing system. The general case, in which there are transaction costs on
the dividends, is open. The theory is motivated by credit default swaps and interest rate
swaps.
A Appendix
Lemma A.1. For each t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} and W ∈ L0(Ω,Ft,P;R), if the no-arbitrage
condition under the efficient friction assumption is satisfied for Ka(t,W ) (Kb(t,W )), then
Ra(t,W ) 6= ∅ (Rb(t,W ) 6= ∅).
Proof. Let us first fix t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} and W ∈ L0(Ω,Ft,P;R). We only prove the
lemma for Ka(t,W ), because the proof for Kb(t,W ) is similar. Instead of working with
Ka(t,X), we will work with the more mathematically convenient set
Ka(t,W ) :=
{
G(φ, ξ, t,W ) : φ ∈ P(t), ξ ∈ L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R)
}
,
where P(t) is the set
P(t) := {φ ∈ P : φj is a.s. bounded for j ∈ J ∗, φs = 1{t+1≤s}φs for all s ∈ T
∗},
and
G(φ, ξ, t,W ) :=
N∑
j=1
φjT
(
1
{φj
T
≥0}
P bid,j,∗T + 1{φj
T
<0}
P ask,j,∗T
)
−
N∑
j=1
T∑
u=t+1
∆φju
(
1
{∆φju≥0}
P ask,j,∗u−1 + 1{∆φju<0}P
bid,j,∗
u−1
)
+
N∑
j=1
T∑
u=t+1
φju
(
1
{φju≥0}
Aask,j,∗u + 1{φju<0}A
bid,j,∗
u
)
+ ξ
(
−W +
T∑
u=t+1
D∗u
)
(47)
for all for all RN -valued stochastic processes
(φs)
T
s=1 ∈ L
0(Ω,FT ,P;R
N )× · · · × L0(Ω,FT ,P;R
N ),
38
and random variables ξ ∈ L∞+ (Ω,FT ,P;R).
Since Ka(t,W ) = Ka(t,W ), we may equivalently prove that Ka(t,W )−L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R)
is P-closed wheneverNAEF is satisfied for Ka(t,W ). Let Xm ∈ Ka(t,W )−L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R)
be a sequence converging in probability to some X. We may find a subsequence Xkm
that converges a.s. to X. With an abuse of notation we denote this subsequence by
Xm. By the definition of Ka(t,W ), we may find φm ∈ P(t), ξm ∈ L0+(Ω,Ft,P;R), and
Zm ∈ L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R) so that X
m = G(φm, ξm, t,W )− Zm. Using the same arguments as
in Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we prove that lim supm ‖φ
m
s ‖ < ∞ for all t ∈ T
∗
and lim supm ξ
m < ∞. Then, we apply Lemma 3.5 to show that we may find a strictly
increasing set of positive, integer-valued, FT−1 measurable random variables σ
m such that
φσ
m
converges a.s. to some bounded a.s. predictable process φ, and ξσ
m
converges a.s. to
some ξ ∈ L∞+ (Ω,Ft,P;R). This gives us that G(φ
σm , ξσ
m
, t,W ) − Xσ
m
converges a.s. to
some nonnegative random variable. Therefore Ka(t,W )− L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R) is P-closed.
We now argue that there exists a risk-neutral measure for Ka(t,W ). Towards this,
we define the convex cone Ca := (Ka(t,W ) − L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R)) ∩ L
1(Ω,FT ,P;R). Due to
the closedness property of Ka(t,W ) − L0+(Ω,FT ,P;R), we have that the set C
a is closed
in L1(Ω,FT ,P;R). As in the proof of Theorem 3.5, we may construct a measure Q ∈ Z
such that W is Q-integrable, and EQ[K
a] ≤ 0 for all Ka ∈ Ka(t,X). This completes the
proof.
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